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Abstract
This thesis is a critical commentary on key themes in Emmanuel Levinas’s early works. In 
particular, it addresses the development of Levinas’s thinking about the project of 
fundamental ontology initiated by Martin Heidegger.
In the introduction to his first post-doctoral monograph, Existence and Existents (1947), 
Levinas observes that ‘If  [...] our reflections are in large measure inspired by the 
philosophy of Martin Heidegger, where we find the concept of ontology and of the 
relationship which man sustains with Being, they are also governed by a profound need to 
leave the climate of that philosophy, and by the conviction that we cannot leave it for a 
philosophy that would be pre-Heideggerian.’
This thesis contends that the central elements of Levinas’s philosophical output up to 
Totality and Infinity represent a response to Heidegger’s ontological project. It addresses the 
development of Levinas’s thought from his doctoral thesis on Husserl (1930) and his first 
published essay, ‘Martin Heidegger and Ontology’ (1932) both of which demonstrate a 
fundamental sympathy for Heidegger’s approach, through to his profound criticisms of 
Heidegger in his major work dealing with the relationship between ontology, metaphysics 
and ethics, Totality and Infinity (1961).
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Introduction
This thesis is a commentary on the development of Levinas’s thought from his earliest 
published work (1930) to his major book Totality and Infinity (1961). It proceeds by 
following Levinas’s encounter with the thought of Martin Heidegger. My main contention 
is that Levinas’s entire philosophical output can be characterised as an argument with 
Heidegger.
Levinas’s claim in Totality and Infinity that ethics is ‘first philosophy’ follows a long period of 
increasing distance from Heidegger’s thought. Levinas first read Being and Time (1927) 
during his visit to Freiburg in 1928-9 as part of his doctoral studies at Strasbourg. As he 
put it in an interview in 1982, he ‘went to Freiburg for Husserl, but found Heidegger,’ and 
his doctoral dissertation on Husserl, published as The Theoiy of Intuition in Husserl's 
Phenomenology (1930), and his early essay ‘Martin Heidegger and Ontology’ (1932), both bear 
the evidence of Heidegger’s considerable influence on Levinas’s early thought.
After those early admiring works, Levinas first criticisms o f Heidegger’s ontological 
approach emerge. In On Escape (1936), Levinas speaks of a desire to ‘escape’ being, and by 
the time of his next monograph, Existence and Existents (1947), Levinas’s distance from 
Heidegger has increased considerably. In that work, he observes that ‘If  [...] our 
reflections are in large measure inspired by the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, where we 
find the concept of ontology and of the relationship which man sustains with Being, they 
are also governed by a profound need to leave the climate of that philosophy, and by the 
conviction that we cannot leave it for a philosophy that would be pre-Heideggerian.’1 In 
other works in the 1940s and 1950s, Levinas progressively distances himself from
1 Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis, 1947, (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: 
Duquesne University Press, 2001), 4.
Heidegger’s thought, while in each case addressing Heidegger (explicitly or implicitly) as his 
primary interlocutor during his works of that period. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas 
advances his most serious criticisms of Heidegger and advances his own most radical 
claims.
What are the specific points of disagreement in Levinas’s argument with Heidegger? The 
content of Levinas’s criticisms of Heidegger changes over the course o f the works treated 
in this thesis, but put schematically their disagreements fall into three areas: the 
‘ontological’ distinction between being and beings and the idea o f a ‘relation’ with being; 
the notion o f subjectivity and the mode of relating to other humans; and the relationship 
between philosophy and ethics. I address these issues in turn in body of the thesis.
In the first chapter, I address Levinas’s work from his doctoral thesis, The Theory of Intuition 
in Husserl's Ontology (1930), up to his work written during the second World War, Existence 
and Existents (1947). As I noted above, Levinas’s discussion of Heidegger during the early 
part of this period is primarily admiring, but in On Escape (1934), Levinas’s criticisms of 
Heidegger begin to emerge. In the later works o f this period, Levinas advances the notion 
o f a being which is independent of beings which he calls the ‘there is’ (ily a). Nonetheless, 
in these texts Levinas persists with a conception of philosophy which is strongly influenced 
by Heidegger, and Levinas’s thought remains within Heidegger’s ontological framework. I 
frame my discussion of these works in this chapter in terms of the question of whether 
Heidegger’s conception of the ontological distinction offers anything like Levinas’s notion 
o f a ‘relation to being.’
In the second chapter, I address Levinas’s arguments with Heidegger in Time and the Other
(1947) and the essay ‘Is Ontology Fundamental?’ (1951). The chief issue in these works is
Levinas’s criticism of Heidegger’s characterisation of Da-sein’s structure o f being-with.
For Levinas, our relation to the other is not a matter o f letting the other be. The other is
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not initially understood in his being; rather, the other is encountered as a ‘face’ {visage), in a 
‘face-to-face’ relation. In these works, Levinas introduces the ethical claim about our 
obligation toward the other which is taken up again in his major work Totality and Infinity. I 
frame my discussion of Levinas in terms of Heidegger’s treatment of the concept of being- 
with in Being and Time.
In the third chapter, I examine Levinas’s most significant work of mature philosophy, 
Totality and Infinity. In this work, Levinas advances his most ambitious claims about the 
priority of ethics and the nature of the demand which follows from the encounter with the 
other. After briefly examining Heidegger’s account of the relation between ethics and 
philosophy, I address the Levinas’s key claims of Totality and Infinity, where Levinas sets out 
again his criticisms of what he calls ‘Heideggerian ontology’ and offers an elaboration of his 
claim that ethics is ‘first philosophy’ and that our encounter with the other gives rise to an 
ethical obligation. I then turn to Derrida’s essay ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ where Derrida 
defends Heidegger against Levinas’s criticisms. Derrida claims that, for Heidegger, the 
‘thought of being,’ which is the essence philosophy, is not practical, and consequently that 
philosophy cannot supply an ethics in the sense of a framework for practical existence. 
Moreover, according to Derrida, if anything represented ‘first philosophy’ for Heidegger, it 
was the ‘thinking of being’ which motivated his entire philosophical corpus.
A note on scope
As I have indicated, this thesis addresses Levinas’s work up to his major book Totality and 
Infinity. Levinas wrote a considerable number of books after that one, and to deal with 
them all would be beyond the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, it is important to observe 
that in his most important philosophical work written after Totality and Infinity, Otherwise than 
Being or Beyond Essence (1974), Levinas returns to the central arguments o f Totality and Infinity
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and radicalises the claims he advanced there.2 For that reason, I take Totality and Infinity to 
represent a statement of Levinas’s mature philosophical position.
Since Levinas’s arguments against Heidegger draw primarily on Heidegger’s position in 
Being and Time (1927), for the most part I limit my exposition of Heidegger to that text In 
chapter three, however, I examine Heidegger’s discussion of the relationship between 
ethics and philosophy in his later ‘Letter on Humanism’ (1947).
A note on translation
Following the Joan Stambaugh translation, I have rendered the central concept o f 
Heidegger’s Being and Time as T)a-sein.’ I have left quoted instances of ‘Being’ unchanged, 
but also following Stambaugh, in my own discussions I have used ‘being’ rather than 
‘Being’ for Heidegger’s Sein, trusting that the intended sense will be clear from the context. 
As Stambaugh observes, ‘capitalising “being,” although it has the dubious merit of treating 
“being” as something unique, risks implying that it is some kind o f Super Thing or 
transcendent Being.’3 The ‘elevation’ of being is a central issue in the Levinas-Heidegger 
debate.
All page references to Being and Time refer to the pagination o f the 1953 Niemeyer edition 
of Sein und Zeit.
A note on gender-specific language
While the category of the other {Tautrui) does not refer to any particular other, Levinas and 
his translators have used masculine pronouns when referring to it in all the passages cited
2 See Adman T. Peperzak, ‘Beyond Being/ Research in Phenomenology 8 (1978).
3 Translator’s Preface to Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh, 1927, (Albany, New York: 
State University o f New York Press, 1996), xiv.
in this thesis.4 I have not altered these translations, and for the most part I have followed 
the translators' practice in my own use of masculine pronouns to refer to the other.
4 There has been considerable scholarly discussion of Levinas’s relationship to feminism. For an overview, 
see Stella Sandford, ‘Levinas, Feminism and the Feminine,’ in The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, eds. Simon 
Critchley and Robert Bemasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
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1Being, existence, existents and 
phenomenology: 1930-1947
This chapter traces the development of Levinas’s philosophy during the period from his 
doctoral dissertation (1930) to Existence and Existents (1947). In particular, it addresses the 
shift in Levinas’s relationship to the thought of Martin Heidegger during that period. The 
two problems at the core of this exchange are, first, the nature of philosophical inquiry, 
including the question of whether phenomenological ontology is the correct method for 
such inquiry; and second, the question of what Heidegger calls the ontological distinction, 
and what Levinas describes as the ‘relation with being.’
Levinas’s doctoral dissertation, published as The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology 
(1930), reveals evidence of Heidegger’s considerable influence on Levinas’s early thought. 
After his dissertation, Levinas’s next published essay, ‘Martin Heidegger and Ontology’ 
(1932), gave an admiring summary of Heidegger’s Being and Time and was intended to form 
the foundation for a lengthy study of Heidegger’s thought. In both his doctoral 
dissertation and that early essay, Levinas reveals a firm conviction that Heidegger’s 
philosophical method, that of phenomenological ontology, is the correct path for 
philosophical investigation.1 Shortly after those works, however, Levinas develops a more 
critical approach to Heidegger. In On Escape (1934), Levinas begins to look for a ‘path out 
of being’ which, while not entirely clear as a concept on its own, represented the beginning 
of a fundamental challenge to Heidegger’s thought. Then, in Existence and Existents (1947), 
Levinas challenges Heidegger’s conception of the relationship between being and beings.
1 Heidegger says that ‘philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology’ in Heidegger, Being and Time, 38.
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Prior to the question of the relation between being and beings, however, is the question of 
the proper method of philosophical enquiry. Heidegger and Levinas both fall within the 
phenomenological tradition inaugurated by Husserl. According to Adriaan Peperzak’s 
schema of the Husserl-Heidegger-Levinas sequence, Husserl began the phenomenological 
revolution in philosophy, Heidegger exploited the possibilities of phenomenology and 
transformed it into an ontology, and Levinas developed phenomenological ontology and 
attempted to overcome it through a ‘radical renewal of “metaphysics,” rehabilitating the 
existent [...] by a thought “beyond being.’”2 While Levinas’s ‘radical renewal of 
metaphysics’ does not appeared as a fully-worked-out concept until his 1961 book Totality 
and Infinity, in works of the 1930s and 1940s up to his essay ‘Is Ontology Fundamental?’ 
(1951) Levinas increases his distance from Heidegger’s fundamental-ontological project. 
Nonetheless, as Levinas notes in Existence and Existents (1947), his attempt to discover a 
way out of the climate o f Heidegger’s philosophy does not mistake itself for a search for a 
pre-Heideggerian philosophy.3 With this claim, Levinas suggests that philosophical enquiry 
changed fundamentally after Heidegger. Given that Levinas’s later thought largely rejects 
the project o f fundamental ontology, what does the early Levinas consider to be 
Heidegger’s contribution to philosophy? This chapter is addressed primarily to that 
question.
The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology (1930)
Levinas’s doctoral dissertation on the philosophy of Husserl, The Theory of Intuition in 
Husserl's Phenomenology, was his earliest published work. After Levinas had spent the 1927- 
1928 academic year in Freiburg studying with Husserl and Heidegger, the dissertation was 
submitted in 1929 and published in Paris in 1930. In the following section, I shall not
2 Adriaan T. Peperzak, Beyond: The Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University 
Press, 1997), 38.; the idea of a good ‘beyond being’ appears in Plato’s Republic, 509b.
3 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 4.
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attempt to show whether Levinas’s interpretation of Husserl in this work is correct; rather, 
I shall argue that his interpretation shows evidence of having been shaped by Heidegger’s 
influence. As Levinas recalled in an interview in 1982, ‘the work that I did [...] on “the 
theory of intuition” in Husserl was [...] influenced by Sein und Zeit, to the extent that I 
sought to present Husserl as having perceived the ontological problem of being.’4
As Pepereak notes, Levinas treats Husserl’s philosophy as at the same time a theory of 
consciousness and an ontology.5 Levinas claims in the preface to The Theory of Intuition in 
Husserl’s Phenomenology that ‘a method is never merely an instrument made to explore any 
part of reality’ and that his project in that work is to show how ‘the intuition which 
[Husserl] proposes as a mode of philosophising follows from his very conception of 
being.’6 According to Levinas, Husserl gave us the ‘possibility o f passing from and through 
the theory o f knowledge to the theory of being.’7 ‘Husserl’s step forward beyond 
Descartes,’ according to Levinas,
consists in not separating the knowledge o f  an object — or, more generally, the m ode 
o f  appearing o f  an object in our life — from its being; it consists o f  seeing the m ode o f  
its being known as the expression and the characteristic o f  its m ode o f  being.8
Levinas’s interpretation of Husserl can be broken down into a number of elements. First, 
according to Levinas, Husserl understood phenomenology not as the study o f phenomena 
distinct from their essences, but the study of phenomena as the available mode of presentation 
of their essences. In this way, on Levinas’s account, Husserl claims that the 
phenomenological approach charges us to investigate the ‘meaning’ of the existence of
4 Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, trans. Richard A. Cohen, 1982, 
(Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1985), 39.
5 Peperzak, Beyond, 41.
6 Emmanuel Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology, trans. Andre Orianne, Second ed., 1930, 
(Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1995), xxxii.
7 Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserls Phenomenology, 32.
8 Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserls Phenomenology, 32.
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phenomena as they are presented to us in the phenomenological reduction.9 Second, 
according to Levinas, Husserl thinks that access to essences can be achieved because 
human consciousness is directed towards the world, and because our experience of the 
world is characterised by intentionality; indeed, ‘intentionality is what makes up the very 
subjectivity of the subject.’10 Intuition, as a kind of intentionality, is the mode of 
knowledge which ‘reaches out’ to objects. Third, intuition is not an unreliable, 
‘unobjective’ form of knowledge but ‘the act which claims to put us in contact with being 
and is the sole locus of truth.’11
Levinas’s first claim about Husserl — that phenomenology gives access to the essence of 
phenomena — puts Husserl very close to Heidegger. In Being and Time, Heidegger says that 
the ‘phenomenological concept of phenomenon, as self-showing, means the being of 
beings’: phenomenological analysis of our experience of beings gives us access to their 
being.12 Heidegger’s ontological analysis of Da-sein takes him beyond Husserl’s analysis of 
the modes of presentation of worldly phenomena to a description of Da-sein’s modes of 
encountering beings (entities) as ‘handy’ uhanden) or ‘objectively present’ (vorhanden) for 
Da-sein, but insofar as, on Levinas’s reading, Husserl’s phenomenology gives us the being 
of beings, then his position is consonant with Heidegger’s.
The second strand of Levinas’s interpretation o f Husserl is less obviously Heideggerian. 
According to Levinas, Husserl holds that intentionality, as an act of consciousness directed 
towards the world, is what constitutes us as subjects. Intuition does not feature in 
Heidegger’s account of how we encounter entities in the world; instead, Heidegger offers 
the concept of being-in-the-world to describe our mode of encountering beings in the 
world. But just as Levinas’s Husserl claims that intentionality is constitutive of subjectivity,
9 Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology, 122-131.
10 Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology, 41.
11 Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology, 153.
12 Heidegger, Being and Time, 35.
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Heidegger claims that being-in-the-world is the ‘fundamental constitution’ of Da-sein.13 
The mode of encountering the world is constitutive o f subjectivity or Da-sein respectively.
On the third point, Husserl is again made to agree with Heidegger. For both Heidegger 
and Levinas’s Husserl, truth is a mode of the revelation of the being of an entity. 
According to Levinas, Husserl claims that ‘it is in [the] presence of consciousness to 
objects’ that the ‘primary phenomenon of truth lies.’14 Indeed, for Levinas’s Husserl, the 
‘primary phenomenon of truth [...] consists in facing being.’15 As Heidegger argues,
To say that a statement is true means that it discovers the beings in themselves. It 
asserts, it shows, it lets beings “be seen” (apophansi.s) in their discoveredness. The being 
true {truth) o f  the statement must be understood as discovering. Thus, truth by no means 
has the structure o f  an agreement between knowing and the object in the sense o f  a 
correspondence o f  one being (subject) and another (object).16
By pointing to the inadequacy of the traditional account of truth as a relation of 
correspondence, Heidegger hopes to show, as Hubert Dreyfus puts it, that ‘truth cannot be 
an abstract, timeless relation of correspondence’ between free-floating propositions and 
timeless, uninterpreted facts.17 Both Heidegger and Levinas’s Husserl reject the dominant 
account of truth which considers it ‘the adequation’ — a relationship of correspondence -  
of ‘thought to things.’
Levinas’s criticism of Husserl in The Theory of Intuition in Husserl also demonstrates the 
influence of Heidegger on his interpretation. Levinas’s central charge against Husserl is 
that his account is ‘intellectualist.’ What does the charge of intellectualism mean for 
Levinas? There are two related elements in Levinas’s accusation, which I shall set out 
briefly and then elaborate below. First, at the heart o f the problem, is Husserl’s goal of
13 Heidegger, Being and Time, 52.
14 Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology, 88.
15 Levinas, The Theoiy of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology, 89.
16 Heidegger, Being and Time, 218-219.
17 Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the- World: A  Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I, (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1991), 278.
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modelling philosophical inquiry on scientific inquiry. For Levinas, this misconceives the 
role of philosophy. Second, the ‘suprahistorical attitude of theory’ which the scientific 
model promotes leads Husserl to conceive of all our conscious life as theoretical. In turn, 
this theoretical, suprahistorical conception of consciousness leads Husserl to neglect the 
‘historical situation of man’ and the ‘historicity o f consciousness.’ In other words, 
Levinas’s complaint is that Husserl’s suprahistorical conception of consciousness — 
captured in the phenomenological reduction in which the philosopher ‘neutralises’ herself 
as a person living in the world -  leads Husserl to neglect the historical and social nature of 
human existence.18
According to Levinas, Husserl conceived o f philosophy as ‘a universally valid science in the 
manner of geometry and the sciences of nature, as a science which is developed through 
the efforts of generations of scientists, each continuing the work of the others.’19 As 
Levinas observes, Husserl’s conception of philosophy does not entail that philosophy 
should borrowing the concepts of the sciences, but rather that it should model itself on 
them. Taking science as a model for philosophy, according to Levinas, is to say that ‘the 
function, the role of philosophy, and the role o f the sciences in our life, are of the same 
type; that philosophy occupies the same place in the metaphysical destiny of man’ as the 
sciences.20 Levinas’s criticism is that in Husserl’s conception, ‘philosophy seems as 
independent of the historical situation o f man as any theory that tries to consider 
everything sub specie aetemitatis.m
Levinas’s mention of the ‘historical situation o f man’ here is not meant to suggest that
humankind’s fundamental nature will change over time so that science which is valid at one
time will not be valid at another. Levinas, following Heidegger, insists that the subject (or
18 Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology, 157.
19 Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology, 155.
20 Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserfs Phenomenology, 155.
21 Levinas, The Theoiy of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology, 155.
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Da-sein) is fundamentally historical and temporal. For Levinas, human life has a historical 
character in the sense that is captured by the phrase ‘all persons have a history.’ ‘It is 
through this sui generis phenomenon in the constitution of a personality,’ according to 
Levinas, ‘that man has a specific manner of being his past that is inconceivable in the case 
of a stone.’22 Moreover, this historicity — this condition o f ‘being our past’ — is a primary 
property of humankind: ‘Historicity and temporality form the very substantiality of man’s 
substance.’23
Levinas claims that for Husserl, consciousness is primarily theoretical, which means that it 
is first o f all reflective and contemplative. For Husserl, philosophy begins with the 
reduction. According to Levinas, the reduction ‘is an act in which we consider life in all its 
concreteness but no longer live it.’24 Levinas asks:
Is our main attitude toward reality that o f  theoretical contemplation? Is not the world 
presented in its very being as a centre o f  action, as a field o f  activity or o f  care — to 
speak the language o f  Martin Heidegger?25
For Levinas, Heidegger’s contribution is to challenge Husserl’s notion of the primacy of 
theoretical consciousness and to insist instead that Da-sein is primordially historical and 
social. According to Levinas, Husserl neglects the historicity of humankind’s substance: at 
least in his work published up to that date (1929), Levinas claims that Husserl ‘never 
discusses the relation between the historicity of consciousness and its intentionality, its 
personality, its social character.’26
Levinas claims that the absence of this aspect of consciousness in Husserl’s work is 
explained by ‘the general spirit o f his thought,’ because the ‘historicity of consciousness
22 Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology, 156.
23 Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology, 156.
24 Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology, 155.
25 Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology, 119.
26 Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology, 156.
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does not appear as an original phenomenon, because the suprahistorical attitude of theory 
supports [...] all our conscious life.’ The intellectualist position fails to ask how the 
‘neutralisation’ of life that occurs in the phenomenological reduction ‘has its foundation in 
life: ‘How does man in the naive attitude, immersed in the world, the “bom  dogmatic,” 
suddenly become aware of his naivete?’27 Positing representation as the basis of 
consciousness ‘undermines the historicity of consciousness’ and gives intuition the 
‘intellectualist character’ that Levinas complains of.28 Like Heidegger, Levinas insists here 
on the fundamental historicity and temporality of Da-sein: Levinas says that historicity and 
temporality ‘form the very substantiality of man’s substance;’ for Heidegger, Da-sein is 
‘rooted’ in temporality, and T)a-sein “is” its past in the manner of its being.’29
On Levinas’s account, Husserl’s hope that philosophy would become a rigorous science 
has not been realised. Indeed, as Levinas says in a later essay, ‘it is very likely that 
philosophy resists this mode of spiritual life.’30 Nonetheless, as Colin Davis notes, Husserl 
offered Levinas a method of philosophical investigation which relied neither on dogmatic 
assertion nor on unsystematic intuition.31 Indeed, for Levinas, Husserl provided ‘the 
concrete meaning of the very possibility o f “working in philosophy.’”32 Nonetheless, as 
Peperzak notes, both Levinas’s hermeneutic method — ‘based on the supposition that 
philosophy is a specific practice and mode o f being rooted in concrete existence’ — and his 
specific criticisms of Husserl are inspired by Heidegger.33 In his later essay ‘Signature’ 
(1970), Levinas acknowledges that Heidegger’s achievement is to take Husserl’s 
phenomenological method and direct it towards the fundamental ‘condition’ for all entities,
27 Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology, 157.
28 Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology, 157.
29 Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology, 156; Heidegger, Being and Time, 351, 20, emphasis in 
original.
30 Emmanuel Levinas, ‘Reflections on Phenomenological “Technique”,’ trans. Richard A. Cohen and Michael 
B. Smith, in Discovering Existence with Husserl (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998), 91.
31 Colin Davis, Levinas: An Introduction, (Cambridge: Polity, 1996), 8.
32 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 28.
33 Peperzak, Btyond, 44.
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their being.34
'Martin Heidegger and Ontology' (1932)
Heidegger’s inspirational effect on Levinas during this period is also clear in Levinas’s 1932 
essay ‘Martin Heidegger and Ontology.’ This essay offers an admiring recapitulation of key 
themes of Heidegger’s Being and Time, and according to Jacques Rolland, it represents the 
‘first substantial study in French’ of Heidegger’s work.35 Levinas observes in a footnote 
that it was intended to be part of book on Heidegger, but this project was abandoned after 
Heidegger’s public commitment to National Socialism in 1933.36 In this essay, however, 
Levinas’s approach to Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology is sympathetic, and it 
reflects the endorsement of Heidegger’s work that he offered in his dissertation.
Levinas gives a careful exposition of Heidegger’s work in this essay, and he praises the 
originality and forcefulness of Heidegger’s analysis: ‘anyone who has studied philosophy,’ 
he says, ‘cannot, when confronted by Heidegger’s work, fail to recognise how the 
originality and force of his achievements, stemming from genius, are combined with an 
attentive, painstaking, and close working-out of the argument.’37 While there are no explicit 
criticisms of Heidegger in this essay, it does reveal Levinas’s early attention to the concept 
of being-in-the-world. Levinas draws attention to the necessary connection between the 
question of being and the analytic of Da-sein, and emphasises that Heidegger devotes a 
considerable part of Being and Time to the analytic of ‘fallen Da-sein plunged into “everyday
34 Emmanuel Levinas, ‘Signature,’ trans. Sean Hand, in Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism (London: The 
Athlone Press, 1990), 292.
35 Jacques Rolland, ‘Getting Out o f Being by a New Path,’ trans. Bettina Bergo, in On Escape (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 2003), 7.
36 Simon Critchley, ‘Introduction,’ in The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, eds. Simon Critchley and Robert 
Bemasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 8.
37 Emmanuel Levinas, ‘Martin Heidegger and Ontology,’ Diacritics 26.1 (1996): 11.
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life.’”38
On Escape (1936)
On Escape represents a change in the direction of Levinas’s thought and in his relation to 
Heidegger. While the ideas presented in this work are not fully worked out, it does, as 
Rolland notes, introduce a new ‘space of questioning’ within which Levinas’s investigation 
subsequently proceeds.39 As Levinas notes in the preface to the second French edition of 
his 1947 work Existence and Existents, his philosophy ‘remained faithful to [On Escape’s] 
finality, even if it varied in its terminology, its formulas, its operative concepts and certain 
of its theses.’40
‘Escape’ in this text refers to a desire to escape being.41 Heidegger’s project is to think 
being through an analysis of the being of Da-sein, and until this point, Levinas has adopted 
entirely Heidegger’s conception of philosophy: as he expressed it in ‘Martin Heidegger and 
Ontology,’ ‘the search for meaning, ontology, is philosophy itself.542 Philosophy’s concern, 
Levinas agreed, was to uncover the meaning o f being through the existential analysis of 
Da-sein. In On Escape, however, Levinas seeks to ‘renew the ancient problem of being qua 
being.’43 For the Levinas o f On Escape, the task of philosophy is to ask:
What is the structure o f  this pure being? D oes it have the universality Aristode 
conferred on it? Is it the ground and limit o f  our preoccupations, as certain modern 
philosophers would have it? O n the contrary, is it nothing else than the mark o f  a 
certain civilisation, firmly established in the fait accompli o f  being and incapable o f  
getting out o f  it? And, in these conditions, is excendence [escape from being] possible, 
and how would it be accomplished? What is the ideal o f  happiness and human dignity
38 Levinas, ‘Martin Heidegger and Ontology,’ 26.
39 Rolland, ‘Getting Out o f Being by a New Path,’ 4.
40 Noted in Rolland, ‘Getting Out of Being by a New Path,’ 4.
41 In other translations, I’evasion is rendered as ‘evasion.’
42 Levinas, ‘Martin Heidegger et l’ontologie,’ Revue Philosophique, 414.
43 Emmanuel Levinas, On Escape, trans. Bettina Bergo, 1936, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
2003), 56.
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that it promises?44
Heidegger is the first of these ‘modem philosophers’ from whom Levinas wants to distance 
himself insofar as they see in being ‘the ground and limit o f our preoccupations.’45 
Heidegger was certainly explicidy concerned to ‘retrieve’ the question of being.46 What was 
inadequate about his attempt? According to Levinas, Heidegger’s renewal of the question 
of being was insuffidendy radical because it failed to think ‘bdng qua being,’ ‘pure’ or 
‘abstract’ being. Levinas supplements the concept of transcendence, which is a better or 
worse way of describing the encountering the world in Husserl and Heidegger, with the 
idea of excendence, the desire for an escape from being.
According to Levinas, we stand in a relation to existence. This relationship between the 
self and (its) being is manifested particularly in certain states, and in On Escape he analyses 
the phenomena of desire-for-escape (which he calls ‘excendence’), laziness, fatigue and 
insomnia for the insights that they give into the structure of this relationship. Levinas’s 
early works offers evocative phenomenological accounts of what he sometimes calls ‘states 
of the soul’ which are prefigured by Heidegger’s analyses of angst and fear in Being and 
Time. As Simon Critchley puts it, ‘Levinas is concerned with trying to excavate the pre- 
theoretical layers of our intentional comportment towards the world, an archaeology of the 
pre-reflective constitution of existence.’47 In this case, the phenomena of excendence, 
laziness, fatigue and insomnia are interpreted by Levinas ‘attempts to escape from 
existence, to flee from one’s own being.’ Our longing for escape shows us the nature of 
our relation with being. Existence entails suffering, but the suffering that it entails is 
different from the trials of daily life. Rather, ‘the ground of suffering consists o f the
44 Levinas, On Escape, 56.
45 Jacques Rolland, ‘Annotations,’ trans. Bettina Bergo, in On Escape (Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 2003), Annotation no.3.
46 Section 1 of the Introduction to Being and Time is titled ‘The Necessity of an Explicit Retrieve o f the 
Question of Being.’
47 Simon Critchley, ‘Emmanuel Levinas (1905-1996),’ Radical Philosophy (1996).
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impossibility of interrupting it, of an acute feeling of being held fast [rive, riveted]’: ‘what 
counts [...] in all this experience of being is the discovery [...] of its very fact, o f the 
permanent quality [inamovibilite\ itself of our presence.’48
What do the notions of escape or pure being or being qua being refer to for Levinas? 
These concepts remain underdeveloped in this work. The term ‘escape’ refers to ‘world­
weariness, the disorder of our time [mal du siecleJ.’49 As Rolland notes, the renewal of the 
question of being begins with human existing ‘becoming aware of its own existence, of the 
very fact of this existence, and of the irrevocable quality o f its presence.’50 Levinas says that 
escape ‘is the need to get out of oneself, that is, to break that most radical and unalterably binding 
of chains, the fact that the I  [mot] is oneself [soi-meme]fx As Rolland notes, ‘what lies hidden in 
this metaphor [of escape] is the urgent requirement of a thinking beyond being, understood 
in its verbal sense, a requirement that will not find adequate philosophical expression until 
the counter-concept of “otherwise than being” is forged’ in Levinas’s 1974 work Otherwise 
than Being or Beyond Essence.52
'Ontology within the Temporal' (1940)
Levinas’s 1940 essay ‘Ontology within the Temporal’ represents an important shift in 
Levinas’s reading of Being and Time.55 Jacques Taminiaux observes that unlike Levinas’s 
contemporaries, who thought that Heidegger’s 1927 text was ‘an anthropology full of 
pathos,’ Levinas saw that the ontological problem was the only one that interested 
Heidegger, and that he treated human being only insofar is it would illuminate the question
48 Levinas, On Escape, 52.
49 Levinas, On Escape, 52.
50 Rolland, ‘Getting Out o f Being by a New Path,’ 12.
51 Levinas, On Escape, 55, emphasis in original.
52 Rolland, ‘Getting Out of Being by a New Path,’ 6; Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, 
trans. Alphonso Lingis, 1974, (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1998).
53 Emmanuel Levinas, ‘L'ontologie dans le temporel,’ in En decouvrant Pexistence avec Husserl et Heidegger (Paris: J. 
Vtin, 1974).
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‘what is it to be?’54 In this essay, Taminiaux detects ‘the firm, though discrete, anticipation 
of the criticism articulated in [Levinas’s] first essays published after the war [Existence and 
Existents and Time and the Other\ and later more fully elaborated in Totality and Infinity,’55
In this essay Levinas gives an encapsulated description of the critique of Heidegger that he 
will develop in subsequent works:
By raising the ontological problem, [Heidegger] subordinates ontic truth, which is 
directed toward the other, to the ontological question, which is an issue within the 
self, within the ‘on eself who by their existence has a relation with the being which is 
their own. That relation with being is the truly original interiority. In this way, 
Heidegger’s philosophy is an attempt to posit the person — as the site o f  the 
comprehension o f  being. [In being-towards-death,] the person discovers the 
nothingness upon which they stand, which also means that they do not rest on  
anything other than themselves.56
In this paragraph, Levinas announces the claim that will become the target of much of his 
subsequent work: Heidegger here asserts the primacy of the relation with being — which is a 
relationship of comprehension and of what Heidegger calls ‘mineness’ {Jemeinigkeit) — over 
the relation with the other.
Existence and Existents (1947)
In the preface to Existence and Existents, Levinas gives a clear indication o f his intention to 
overcome Heidegger’s philosophy: he asserts that his reflections in that work are ‘governed 
by a profound need to leave the climate of [Heidegger’s] philosophy.’ But at the same 
time, Levinas is inspired ‘by the conviction that we cannot leave it for a philosophy that 
would be pre-Heideggerian.’57 Levinas’s short book Existence and Existents and his series of
54 Jacques Taminiaux, ‘The Early Levinas's Reply to Heidegger's Fundamental Ontology,’ Philosophy and Social 
Criticism 23.6 (1997): 29.
55 Taminiaux, ‘Levinas's reply to Heidegger,’ 29.
56 Levinas, ‘L'ontologie dans le temporel,’ 89, my translation.
57 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 4.
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lectures published as Time and the Other (also 1947) offer a response to Heidegger’s inquiry 
into fundamental ontology that suggests the outline of a philosophical project which will 
differ profoundly from Heidegger’s. As Peperzak observes, Levinas’s criticisms of 
Heidegger in these works are mosdy implicit.58 Nonetheless, Levinas advances claims in 
these texts which constitute real disagreements with Heidegger, and the purpose of the 
remainder of this chapter and the first part of the following chapter is to uncover those 
direct challenges to Heidegger.
As Robert Bemasconi notes in his foreword to the English translation of Existence and 
Existents, in 1947 Levinas already understands his project in this work in terms of an 
attempt to detach being from its dependence on beings in order to examine the nature of 
‘transcendence’ and (in Plato’s phrase) ‘the good beyond being,’ which emerge as key 
concepts in his later works.59 Existence and Existents, however, is a developmental work. 
The ideas for which Levinas is best known, the idea of a relation with alterity and the 
ethical demand of the face of the other, are only nascent here, and the latter thought does 
not appear explicidy until his 1951 essay ‘Is Ontology Fundamental?’.60
What does Levinas mean by the terms ‘existence’ and ‘existent’? He says in the 
contemporary work Time and the Other that he refers to existence and existents in favour of 
being (Seiri) and beings (Seiendes) ‘for reasons o f euphony.’61 But for the purposes of 
relating Levinas’s position with Heidegger’s, I shall take Levinas’s terms existence and 
existents to correspond with Heidegger’s notions of being and beings (or entities) respectively.
58 Peperzak, Beyond, 49.
59 Robert Bemasconi, ‘Foreword,’ in Existence and Existents (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University 
Press, 2001), xi.
60 Emmanuel Levinas, ‘Is Ontology Fundamental?,’ in Emmanuel Eevinas: Basic Philosophical Writings, eds. 
Adriaan T. Peperzak, Simon Critchley and Robert Bemasconi (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University 
Press, 1996).
61 Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. Richard Cohen, 1947, (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne 
University Press, 1985), 44.
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The position presented in Existence and Existents differs from Heidegger’s on three points 
which I shall set out briefly and then elaborate below. First, Levinas contradicts one of 
Heidegger’s fundamental contentions about being. Heidegger’s claim is that being is always 
the being of a being.62 In particular, he denies that being — such as the being to which Da- 
sein is primordially related, which he calls Existen% — can be defined by giving a ‘what’ that 
specifies its content.63 On Levinas’s account, however, there is being independent of beings. 
He calls this being the i ly  a, or the ‘there is.’ Second, Levinas seems to imply that 
Heidegger is making a claim about humankind’s concrete concern for being and its 
aversion to death. As Bemasconi notes in his foreword to Existence and Existents, Levinas, 
like Adorno, took Heidegger to claim that human being is concerned about its own being, 
‘thereby implying that Heidegger was in some way associated with Social Darwinism.’64 I 
discuss Levinas’s treatment o f death and Heidegger’s concept of being-toward-death 
below. Third, Levinas’s account contradicts what Heidegger refers to in his argument 
about temporality as the ontological meaning of care as the ek-stasis o f temporality.’65 
According to Heidegger, the fact that we relate to the past, the present and the future is an 
essential or primordial aspect of the being of Da-sein. On his view, the meaning of Da- 
sein’s being is that it exists ecstatically — in other words, outside of itself in time — and that 
this represents its mode of relating to its own being. Against Heidegger’s ek-stasis, Levinas 
introduces the concept of hypostasis, which he uses to refer to the idea of existence 
appearing as a burden to be taken up; the analysis of this phenomenon, says Levinas, 
reveals human being’s special relation to the instant which differs from Heidegger’s 
explication of ek-stasis. In the following sections I shall elaborate these disagreements and 
address their relationship to Levinas’s broader philosophical project.
62 Heidegger, Being and Time, 9. In other translations, this formulation appears as ‘Being is always the Being of 
an entity.’
63 Heidegger, Being and Time, 12.
64 Bemasconi, ‘Foreword,’ xii.
65 ‘Ecstasies’ appears as ‘ecstases’ or ‘ek-stasis’ in other translations. I follow the Stambaugh translation here.
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Before turning to these points of disagreement, it is worth recalling some of the basic 
claims of Heidegger’s position in Being and Time in order to make clear the targets of 
Levinas’s argument. What is the project of Being and Time? The central question of Being 
and Time -  W hat is the meaning of being?’ -  is not addressed as an abstract problem. 
Instead, Heidegger preliminary step is to analyse Da-sein, or human being, in order to 
approach that fundamental question. Why is Da-sein a candidate for such an 
interrogation? According to Heidegger, Da-sein is a being whose being is an issue for it, 
and Da-sein has a relationship o f understanding towards being. Because ‘understanding of 
being is itself a determination of the being of Da-sein,’ then ‘fundamental ontology [...] 
must be sought in the existential analysis of Da-sein.’66
Distinguishing being from beings
According to Levinas, the distinction between
that which exists and its existence itself, between [...] individual beings designated by 
substantives and the event or act o f  their existence, im poses itself upon philosophical 
reflection -  and with equal facility disappears from its view. It is as though thought 
becomes dizzy pouring over the emptiness o f  the very to exist, which we seem not to  
be able to say anything about, which only becom es intelligible in its participle, the 
existent, that which exists. Thought slips imperceptibly from the notion o f  being qua 
being, that by virtue o f  which an existing being exists, to the idea o f  a cause o f  
existence, a “being in general,” [...] and not the deed, activity, pure event or work, o f  
being. This latter will be understood in confusion with beings.67
By implication, Heidegger’s error is to understand ‘the deed, activity, pure event or work of 
being,’ ‘in confusion with beings.’68 Is Heidegger guilty of the confusion that Levinas 
attributes to him? As we have seen, Heidegger claims that being is always the being of a
66 Heidegger, Being and Time, 12,13.
67 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 1.
68 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 1.
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being.69 Being is not a being in the sense of phainomenon, something which shows itself. 
The ground of beings does not appear as a being itself.70 For this reason, for Heidegger, 
the question of the meaning of being involves inquiry into the being of particular beings. 
Heidegger takes Da-sein, or human being, as the starting-point of his inquiry because Da- 
sein, in its essence, always already holds a kind of preliminary or guiding appreciation of 
being. Levinas’s project in 'Existence and Existents, however, is give to an account of being in 
general
For Levinas, thinking being without beings is simultaneously necessary and difficult: as we 
have just seen, he thinks that ‘the distinction between that which exists and its existence 
itself [...] imposes itself on philosophical reflection — and with equal facility disappears 
from its view.’71 Indeed, Levinas admits thinking about the verb ‘to exist’ is dizzying, and 
separating being and beings means dealing with slippery concepts. But the fact that being 
and beings are difficult to distinguish satisfactorily is not accidental; rather, Levinas thinks 
that it is ‘due to the habit of situating the instant, the atom of time, outside of any event.’72 
Crucially, according to Levinas, our relationship with the fact that there is being constitutes 
a disquieting event. Levinas asks: T)oes not being in general become the being of “a being” 
by an inversion, by that event which is the present?’73 According to Levinas, ‘a being, a 
subject, an existent, arises in impersonal being’ through an event he calls a ‘hypostasis.’74 
The question that Levinas addresses in Existence and Existents is: what is ‘the event o f being, 
being in general, detached from beings which dominate it?’75
69 Heidegger, Being and Time, 9. In other translations, this formulation appears as ‘Being is always the Being of  
an entity.’
70 See Bettina Bergo, l^ evinas Between Ethics and Politics: For the Beauty that Adorns the Earth, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 
1999), 43-45.
71 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 1.
72 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 1.
73 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 3.
74 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 3. Levinas’s use of this term is discussed in a translator’s footnote in Time 
and the Other. Translated literally, it means ‘standing under.’ See Levinas, Time and the Other, 43-44.
75 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 2.
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In this work, then, Levinas seeks to approach being in general ‘in its impersonality.’76 How 
does Levinas approach the idea of being in general? As Bemasconi suggests, the themes 
addressed here are in some ways provoked by the author’s sense of hopelessness and 
despair at the time of writing. Written during Levinas’s imprisonment in the Second World 
War, Levinas’s analysis begins with the claim that the hyperbolic expressions of the time, 
such as ‘a world in pieces’ or ‘a world turned upside down,’ convey an authentic feeling. 
‘Stripped of mythological overtones,’ Levinas says, such concerns represent ‘the moment of 
a limit’ and consequendy are ‘singularly instructive.’77 Levinas interprets these situations as 
interruptions of ‘the continual play of our relations with the world,’ where we find ‘neither 
death’ (Heidegger) ‘nor the “pure ego’” (Husserl), ‘but the anonymous state of being.’ 
Indeed, ‘in the situation of an end of the world the primary relationship which binds us to 
being becomes palpable.’78
As well as being provoked by the prevailing feelings of disruption, Levinas’s assertion of 
the concept of being in general is also provoked by his reaction to Heidegger’s renewed 
inquiry into ontology. For Levinas, ontological investigation
affirms that what is essential in human spirituality does not lie in our relationship with 
the things which make up the world, but is determined by a relationship, effected in 
our very existence, with the pure fact that there is being.79
The 'there is' ( i ly  a)
As we have seen, Levinas attempts to describe being which is independent o f beings. He 
calls this being the ily  a, which is usually translated as the ‘there is’.80 While Existence and 
Existents represents Levinas’s earliest attempts to think the ‘there is’ or ‘existence without
76 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 3.
77 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 7-8.
78 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 8.
79 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 3.
80 Heidegger, Being and Time, 9.
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existents, that concept is given surprisingly little direct elaboration. Instead, Levinas 
proceeds by attempting to evoke experiences of it. In a thought-experiment where he 
imagines ‘all beings, things and persons, reverting to nothingness,’ he says:
When the form of things are dissolved in the night, the darkness of the night, which is 
neither an object nor the quality of an object, invades it like a presence. In the night, 
where we are riveted to it, we are not dealing with anything. But this nothing is not 
that of pure nothingness. There is no longer this or that, there is not “something.”
But this universal absence is in its turn a presence, an absolutely unavoidable presence.
It is not the dialectical counterpart of absence, and we do not grasp it through a 
thought. It is immediately there. [...] There is, in general, without it mattering what 
there is, without our being able to fix a substantive to this term. There is is an 
impersonal form, like in it rains, or it is warm.81
When we experience the ‘there is’,
What we call the I is itself submerged by the night, invaded, depersonalised, stifled by 
it. The disappearance of all things and of the I leaves what cannot disappear, the 
sheer fact of being in which one participates, whether one wants to or not, without 
having taken the initiative, anonymously. Being remains, like a field of forces, like a 
heavy atmosphere belonging to no one, universal, returning in the midst of the 
negation which put it aside, and in all the powers to which that negation may be 
multiplied.82
In a 1982 interview, Levinas recounts how his reflection on the phenomenon of the ‘there 
is’ or ‘impersonal being’ began with childhood memories of going to bed while his parents 
were still awake:
E.L.: One sleeps alone, the adults continue life; the child feels the silence of his 
bedroom as “rumbling.”
Ph.N.: A rumbling silence?
E.L.: It is something resembling what one hears when one puts an empty shell close to 
the ear, as if the emptiness was full, as if the silence were a noise. It is something one
81 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 52-53.
82 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 53.
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can also feel when one thinks that even if there were nothing, the fact that “there is” is 
undeniable. Not that there is this or that; but the very scene of being is open: there is.
In the absolute emptiness that one can imagine before creation -  there is.83
He notes in that interview that Existence and Existents tries to describe the ‘there is’, and 
describes it as ‘horror and panic.’84 But even without humans, being, or the ‘there is’, 
remains. Does this claim constitute a real objection to Heidegger? The targets of Levinas’s 
claim that there is existence without existents (or being without beings) are Heidegger’s 
claim that being is always the being of a being, and that Da-sein’s relation to being is one of 
mineness. I shall treat this claim in the following section.
Concern for being
As Bemasconi observes, Levinas, like Adorno, takes Heidegger’s claim that Da-sein is 
concerned with being to mean that Da-sein fears for its life.85 In an interview in 1988, 
Levinas says:
A being is something that is attached to being, to its own being. That is Darwin’s 
idea. [...] It is a question of might. Heidegger says at the beginning of Being and Time 
that Da-sein is a being who in his being is concerned for this being itself. That’s 
Darwin’s idea: the living being struggles for life. The aim of being is being itself.86
This aspect of Levinas’s interpretation of Heidegger arises in part from his reading of 
Heidegger’s ontological analysis of anxiety. Thinking o f Heidegger’s concept of Angst, 
Levinas argues that a conception of being relies entirely on us already having an 
understanding of nothingness:
Anxiety, a comprehension of nothingness, is a comprehension of being only inasmuch 
as being itself is determined by nothingness. A being without anxiety would be an
83 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 48.
84 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 49.
85 Bemasconi, ‘Foreword,’ xi-xii.
86 Tamra Wright, Peter Hughes and Alison Ainley, The Paradox of Morality: an Interview with Emmanuel 
Levinas,’ trans. Andrew Benjamin and Tamra Wright, in The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other, eds. 
Robert Bemasconi and David Wood (London: Roudedge, 1988), 172.
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infinite being -  but that concept is self-contradictory. The dialectic of being and 
nothingness continues to dominate Heideggerian ontology.87
Levinas likens Heideggerian anxiety to a fear of nothingness, and opposes it to a fear of 
being, the ‘horror of the night’ that is the experience of the ‘there is’. Levinas suggests that 
while Heidegger’s investigation of ontology and ‘the relation man sustains with being’ is 
important, there are aspects of it which must be overcome:
The concept which appears to preside over the Heideggerian interpretation of human 
existence is that of existence conceived as ecstasy — which is only possible as an 
ecstasy toward the end. It consequently situates the tragic element in existence in this 
finitude and in the nothingness into which man is thrown insofar as he exists.88
How does Heidegger conceive of existence as ecstasy? In Division Two of Being and Time, 
Heidegger discusses what he calls the ‘ecstasies of temporality’ in order to describe the 
‘ontological meaning of care.’89 Temporality, for Heidegger, is that which makes possible 
the unified being-as-a-whole. Captured in a single phrase, temporality is ‘the unified 
phenomenon of the future that makes present in the process of having-been.’90 The 
ecstasies (disruptions) of temporality named by Heidegger are the phenomena of future, 
having been, and pnsentf These temporal phenomena demonstrate how care, involving 
being-for or being-toward, is Da-sein’s primary mode of being-in-the-world.
Levinas suggests that anxiety about being is as fundamental as anxiety about not-being, or 
death. On Levinas’s reading, fear for being is an essential part of Heidegger’s understanding 
of Da-sein:
Is not anxiety over being — horror of being — just as primal as anxiety over death? Is 
not the fear of being just as originary as the fear for being? It is perhaps even more
87 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 4.
88 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 4, emphasis in original
89 Heidegger, Being and Time., II.III, section 65.
90 Heidegger, Being and Time, 326.
91 Heidegger, Being and Time, 329.
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so, for the former may account for the latter.92
As Levinas argues in his earlier essay ‘Ontology Within the Temporal,’ in Heidegger’s 
conception Angst is not directed towards a particular worldly being, but towards 
nothingness; moreover, it reveals the insignificance of everything in the world, including 
Da-sein.93
What does Heidegger say about the relationship between being, death and Angst? 
According to him, death is a possibility of being that Da-sein always has to take upon 
itself.94 In Angst about death, according to Heidegger, Da-sein is brought before itself.’95 
He argues that ‘being-toward-death is essentially Angst,’ but it is ‘not only Angst and 
certainly not Angst as a mere emotion.’96 Indeed, Angst is not a cowardly fear; rather, ‘the 
they distort this Angst into the fear of a future event.’97
Having posited in Heidegger’s analysis of Angst the notion of an originary fear for being, 
Levinas insists on the fearsomeness of the ‘there is’, the ‘general state of existence’ of 
which being and nothingness are ‘phases’:
Are not being and nothingness, which, in Heidegger’s philosophy, are equivalent or 
coordinated, not rather phases of a more general state of existence, which is nowise 
constituted by nothingness? We shall call it the fact that there is.n
For Levinas, there is a strong link between the ‘rumbling’ of the ‘there is’ and fear of death. 
According to Levinas,
It is because the ‘there is’ has such a complete hold on us that we cannot take 
nothingness and death lighdy, and we tremble before them. The fear of nothingness 
is but the measure of our involvement in being. Existence of itself harbours
92 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 5.
93 Levinas, ‘L'ontologie dans le temporal,’ 84-85.
94 Heidegger, Being and Time, 250.
95 Heidegger, Being and Time, 254.
96 Heidegger, Being and Time, 266 and footnote.
97 Heidegger, Being and Time, 254.
98 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 5.
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something tragic which is not only there because of its finitude. Something that death 
cannot resolve."
Taking up being: 'hypostasis' and 'position'
As we have seen, Levinas thinks that Heidegger’s analysis of Da-sein in Being and Time is 
shaped fundamentally by his analysis of being-toward-the-end, or being-toward-death. 
Levinas’s argument here is prompted in part by Heidegger’s claim that care is being- 
towards-death or being-toward-the-end.100 For Levinas, however, being is something we 
‘take up.’ Levinas argues that the relation o f being to beings is not that of something given, 
but of something to be achieved, or to be gained through a kind of ‘contract.’
As we have seen, Heidegger thinks that being is always the being of a being. Moreover, he 
says that Da-sein has ‘ontological priority’ because it already has an understanding of being, 
and because Da-sein is a being that is concerned with its being.101 Heidegger uses the term 
Da-sein to capture human being’s special mode of relating to existence. Heidegger says:
We shall call the very being to which Da-sein can relate in one way or another, and 
somehow always does relate, existence [Existen%\. And because the essential definition 
of this being cannot be accomplished by ascribing to it a “what” that specifies its 
material content, because its essence lies rather in the fact that it in each instance has 
to be its being as its own, the term Da-sein, as a pure expression of being, has been 
chosen to designate this being.
Da-sein always understands itself in terms of its existence.102
For Heidegger, Da-sein has a relation with being, which he describes as a relation of 
mineness (Jemeinigkeii)}02> Heidegger’s claim that we have a primordial relationship with 
being also appears in his account of ‘modes of attunement’ (Befindlichkeit). Modes of
99 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 5.
100 Heidegger, Being and Time, 329.
101 Heidegger, Being and Time, 12-13.
102 Heidegger, Being and Time, 12.
103 Heidegger, Being and Time, 41.
31
attunement such as fear and anxiety, which are usually described as moods, are 
ontologically important according to Heidegger because they operate in a manner of 
‘originary transcendence/ inescapably opening up certain ways of seeing the world and 
closing off others. They disclose Da-sein ‘in a primordial sense.’104 The ontological 
characteristics of Da-sein revealed through an analysis of moods, which according to 
Heidegger are existentiality, facticity, and falling prey, reveal the structure of Da-sein’s 
being. In this way, moods reveal the relationship we have with being.
Levinas, on the other hand, thinks that our relationship with being is not something 
primordial that can be revealed through ontological analysis, but that it appears in other 
phenomena, and is best described as a process of taking up in a kind of contract. He calls 
this process of taking up ‘hypostasis’ (I’hjpostase). Levinas’s approach in much of Existence 
and Existents is to examine phenomenologically certain human states -  fatigue, insomnia, 
effort, la2iness — in order to see how they reveal how being is taken up. The common 
element of these states is the fact that they show a special relation to the instant.
Existence and Existents is also important for Levinas’s development of the concept of 
‘position,’ which is ‘that condition or basis from which the subject posits itself,’ in 
Bemasconi’s words.105 Levinas offers this argument against Heidegger’s idea of the 
originary thrownness and ecstatic character of Da-sein. Bemasconi suggests that the 
French title, better translated as ‘From Existence to the Existent,’ captures the ‘movement 
whereby the human subject arises in being by taking a position.’106 What does it mean for a 
subject to arise in being by taking a position? I attempt to elucidate Levinas’s answer to 
this question in the following section.
104 Heidegger, Being and Time, 190.
105 Bemasconi, ‘Foreword/ xii.
106 Bemasconi, ‘Foreword/ xii.
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Fatigue, indolence and effort
In Existence and Existents, Levinas attempts to reveal hypostasis through a 
phenomenological analysis of fatigue and effort. His analyses purport to show that the 
human subject is not given, but arises in taking up being.107 While Levinas and Heidegger 
both focus on the relationship between being and beings, Levinas does not assume, as 
Heidegger does, that the relation is ‘always already’ given.
According to Levinas, the relationship between self and its existence, and the appearance 
of existence as ‘a burden to be taken up,’ become preoccupations under circumstances of 
fatigue and indolence. These are good candidates for analysis, he claims, because our 
preoccupation with the relationship between self and its existence become particularly 
acute in such cases.108
What does a phenomenological analysis o f these situations show? According to Levinas’s 
examination, fatigue and indolence are ‘positions taken with regard to existence.’109 They 
are a ‘non-acceptance,’ a ‘recoil before existence’ — indeed, ‘their whole reality is made up 
of that refusal.’ In weariness ‘we want to escape existence itself;’ it is ‘an evasion without 
an itinerary and without an end.’110 Fatigue is ‘an impossibility of following through, a 
constant and increasing lag between being and what it remains attached to.’111 As such, it is 
a ‘condemnation to being.’112
[I]n weariness existence is like the reminder of a commitment to exist, with all the 
seriousness and harshness of an unrevocable contract. [T]he obligation of this 
contract remains incumbent on us like an inevitable ‘one must’ It animates the need 
to act and to undertake, and makes that necessity poignant. Weariness is the
107 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 3.
108 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 4.
109 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 11.
110 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 12.
111 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 18.
112 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 24.
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impossible refusal of this ultimate obligation. In weariness we want to escape 
existence itself. ... An evasion without an itinerary and without an end, it is not trying 
to come ashore somewhere. Like for Baudelaire’s true travellers, it is a matter of 
parting for the sake of parting.113
Indolence is ‘the impossibility of beginning.’114
What fatigue apprehends and abhors in the very exercise of existence, what it 
impotently declines to shoulder, indolence refuses in refusing to shoulder its 
existence.115
What does this analysis show us? Fatigue shows us how the ‘present’ is constituted as a 
kind of lag’:
In the simplicity, unity and obscurity of fatigue, it is like the lag of an existent that is 
tarrying behind its existing. And this lag constitutes the present. Because of this 
distance in existence, existence is a relationship between an existent and itself.116
If the present is thus constituted by the taking charge of the present, if the time-lag of 
fatigue creates the interval in which the present can occur, and if this event is 
equivalent to the upsurge of an existent for which to be means to take up being, the 
existence of an existent is by essence an activity.117
In this way, these phenomena show us how ‘a being, a subject, an existent, arises in 
impersonal Being, though a hypostasis.’118 Action is the taking-up of existence:
To act is to take on a present. This does not amount to repeating that the present is 
the actual, but it signifies that the present is the apparition, in the anonymous 
rumbling of existence, which is at grips with this existence, in relationship with it, 
takes it up. Action is this taking up. Action is then by essence subjection and 
servitude, but also the first manifestation, or the very constitution, of an existent, a 
someone that is.119
113 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 12.
114 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 13.
115 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 17.
116 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 24-25, emphasis in original.
117 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 25.
118 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 3.
119 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 23.
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In this way, the phenomena of fatigue and indolence represent, in Edith Wyschogrod’s 
words, ‘attempts to avoid the imperatives which existence imposes,’ and Levinas’s analysis 
of them reveals pure being as something to be taken on.120 Heidegger’s error in this 
respect, according to Levinas, was to understand Da-sein’s being in terms of our relation 
with things which go to make up the world.
In the effort to separate the notion of the world from the notion of a sum of objects, 
we certainly see one of the most profound discoveries of Heideggerian philosophy.
But in order to describe being-in-the-world, this German philosopher has appealed to 
an ontological finality, to which he subordinates objects in the world. Seeing objects
as “material” -  in the sense that we speak of “war material” -  he has included them in
the care for existing, which for him is the very putting of the ontological problem.
[...] Not everything that is given in the world is a tool.121
Instead, human subjectivity is based on a relation with the bare fact that there is being.
In this chapter, I have addressed the development of Levinas’s thought and its relationship 
to the thought of Heidegger up to Levinas’s 1947 work, Existence and Existents, where we 
have seen evidence of a considerable shift away from Heidegger and towards the notion of 
a being independent of beings. Nonetheless, in these texts Levinas persists with a
conception of philosophy which is strongly influenced by Heidegger, and Levinas’s
terminology, such as excendence and the ily  a remain at bottom ontological concepts. In the 
following chapter, I shall continue my account o f Levinas’s engagement with Heidegger in 
a lecture series from 1947, published as Time and the Other, and the article ‘Is Ontology 
Fundamental?’ (1951), where Levinas asserts for the first time the importance of the 
encounter with the other as a philosophical (and metaphysical) concept.
120 Edith Wyschogrod, Emmanuel Levinas: The Problem of Ethical Metaphysics, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1974), 5.
121 Levinas, Existence and Existents, 34.
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2Existence and the other: 1947-1951
Like other philosophers trained in the modem European tradition, Heidegger and Levinas 
are both concerned to provide accounts of how we know or relate to others. Levinas’s 
account of the experience of encountering others and his analysis of the ethical obligation 
that the encounter entails, which are the central elements of his later work, are developed 
most fully in his book Totality and Infinity (1963) and subsequent works. I discuss Totality 
and Infinity and the direction of Levinas’s later thought in the following chapter. In this 
chapter, I address the earlier development of Levinas’s arguments with Heidegger about 
the relation with other beings in his lecture series Time and the Other (1947) and his essay ‘Is 
Ontology Fundamental?’ (1951). I contend that Time and the Other and ‘Is Ontology 
Fundamental?’ represent the continuation of Levinas’s dispute with Heidegger begun with 
‘Ontology Within the Temporal.’
Heidegger’s treatment of the ‘problem’ of encountering others appears in his first major 
work, Being and Time, as the concept of being-with. I shall set out the main elements of 
Heidegger’s position before discussing Levinas’s criticisms of it.
Being-with in Heidegger
In Being and Time (1927) Heidegger is concerned to develop an account of being through an 
analysis of Da-sein. One of his central claims about the being of Da-sein is that it is 
primordially characterised by being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein). Being-in-the-world is a 
central aspect of Da-sein’s mode of being: he says that being-in-the-world ‘is an a priori
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necessary constitution of Da-sein.’1 Heidegger’s analysis o f being-in-the-world shows how 
Da-sein’s usual manner of encountering the surrounding world is not in terms of objects of 
perception and knowledge but as encountering instrumental objects which form part o f our 
practical activity. The ordinary way that an object like a hammer is for us in our practical 
activity is labelled by Heidegger ‘handiness’ (xuhandenheit).2 In the ordinary course o f our 
dealing with an object, we tend not to notice or perceive explicitly anything about it, but 
rather we attend to what we are doing and use the object more or less automatically. 
According to Heidegger, it is in cases where the instrumental object fails in its ordinary 
functioning — when it becomes ‘objectively present’ (vorhanderi) — that the usually 
transparent network of relations which operates to enable us to use the tool unreflectively 
can become apparent.
Having argued that a fundamental structure of Da-sein is being-in-the-world, Heidegger 
then claims that the fact that there are other humans in the world also enters into the 
structure of Da-sein in a fundamental way. Our encounter with other humans is different 
from our encounter with entities: ‘the kind of being of the existence of the others 
encountered within the surrounding world is distinct from handiness and objective 
presence.’3 ‘The being to which Da-sein is related as being-with does not [...] have the 
kind of being of useful things at hand; it is itself Da-sein.’4 Similarly, he argues:
When others become, so to speak, thematic in their Da-sein, they are not encountered 
as objectively present thing-persons, but we meet them “at work,” that is, primarily in 
their being-in-the-world. Even when we see the other “just standing around,” he is 
never understood as a human-thing objectively present. [...] The other is 
encountered in his Mitda-sein [‘Da-sein-with’] in the world.5
1 Heidegger, Being and Time, 53, emphasis in original.
2 Zuhanden and vorhanden are translated as ‘ready-to-hand’ and ‘present-at-hand’ in the Macquarrie and 
Robinson translation.
3 Heidegger, Being and Time, 118.
4 Heidegger, Being and Time, 121.
5 Heidegger, Being and Time, 120.
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Moreover, according to Heidegger, being-with others is a primordial structure of Da-sein 
even if others are not literally present or nearby. The claim that ‘Da-sein is essentially 
being-with’ is an ‘existential-ontological’ claim. It does not mean that 1 am factically [that 
is, in an everyday sense, in fact] not objectively present alone, rather that others of my kind 
also are.’6 Being-with is an existential attribute: ‘Being-with existentially determines Da-sein 
even when an other is not factically present and perceived.’7 Heidegger also claims, briefly 
and without elaboration, that I can be objectively present with others, and still be alone: 
‘the being-alone of Da-sein, too, is being-with in the world.’8 In that case, ‘even in being 
“among them,” [...] their Mitda-sein is encountered in the mode of indifference and being 
alien.’9 As being-with, Da-sein lets the Da-sein of others be encountered in its world.’10 I 
discuss Levinas’s interpretation of Heidegger’s claims about solitude and letting-be 
(Seinlassen) later in this chapter.
How does Heidegger arrive at this way of characterising our experience of others? In part, 
Heidegger’s thinking on this question emerges from his polemical engagement with other 
attempts to explain the problem of experiencing others. In the following discussion, I shall 
take the position of Husserl’s ‘introduction to phenomenology’ in the Cartesian Meditations 
as representative of the position that Heidegger wants to resist. While the Meditations were 
delivered after the publication of Being and Time, in speaking of subjects and objects, 
Husserl persists with a conception of phenomenology that Heidegger would reject.
In the fifth of the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl gives a phenomenological account of the 
complex way we experience others. Husserl argues that we experience others as 
‘“psychophysical” Objects’ who govern their respective natural organisms; we also
6 Heidegger, Being and Time, 120.
7 Heidegger, Being and Time, 120.
8 Heidegger, Being and Time, 120.
9 Heidegger, Being and Time, 121.
10 Heidegger, Being and Time, 121.
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experience them as ‘world Objects -  not as mere physical things belonging to Nature, 
though indeed as such things in respect of one side of them’; and at the same time, we 
experience others as ''subjects for this world who experience the same world that I experience, 
and, in the same process, experience me, ‘even as I experience the world and others in i t /11
The problem for Husserl is to explain the ‘thereness-for-me’ of others, and on that basis, to 
give a ‘transcendental theory of experiencing someone else .’12 To meet that challenge, he develops a 
picture of how we come to know the other’s conscious experiences that lie ‘behind’ their 
behaviour. He summarises his position in this way: ‘“In” myself I experience and know the 
Other; in me he becomes constituted — appresentatively mirrored, not constituted in the 
original.’13
Heidegger holds that in our everyday mode of being, it would appear to be obvious that we 
are constituted as subjects. Indeed, he asks, ‘what is less dubious than the givenness of the 
I?’14 But, according to Heidegger, this picture rests on a mischaracterisation of Da-sein. 
On the mistaken view, T)a-sein is tacidy conceived in advance as objective presence,’ as a 
self or a ‘worldless subject.’15 This way of thinking about Da-sein rests on a subject-other 
distinction which is motivated by a misguided ‘distinction and isolation of the “I” so that a 
transition from this isolated subject to the others must then be sought.’16 Heidegger is 
unequivocal about this: ‘subject and object are not the same as Da-sein and world.’17
Heidegger rejects accounts of experiencing others like Husserl’s because such accounts 
begin by positing an isolated subject and proceed to build an account on that basis.
11 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. Dorion Cairns, 1929, (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), §43, emphasis in original.
12 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, §43, emphasis in original.
13 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, §62.
14 Heidegger, Being and Time, 115.
15 Heidegger, Being and Time, 115.
16 Heidegger, Being and Time, 118.
17 Heidegger, Being and Time, 60.
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Heidegger’s account of being-in-the-world disdains the language of subjectivity; in general, 
Heidegger’s new terminology is part of an attempt to recast some of the central problems 
of philosophy in ways which will overcome the limitations of the earlier approach. So, for 
Heidegger, being-with is a basic aspect of Da-sein’s being which is more fundamental than 
relating to particular others. In Heidegger’s words, T he world of Da-sein is a with-world. 
Being-in [the world] is being-with others.’18 In fact, according to Heidegger, the ‘others’ are 
those ‘from whom one mostly does not distinguish oneself, those among whom one is, 
too.’19 Against accounts which begin with the subject, he says that ‘others are not 
encountered by grasping and previously discriminating one’s own subject, initially 
objectively present, from other subjects also present.’ Rather, according to Heidegger, 
They are encountered from the world in which Da-sein [...] essentially dwells.’20 Others do 
not usually appear to us as minds, but instead in our average, everyday way of interacting: 
‘being for-, against-, and without-one-another, passing-one-another-by,’ or in ‘not- 
mattering-to-one-another.’21 As Hubert Dreyfus notes, Heidegger seeks to ‘dissolve’ the 
problem of other minds by uncovering the circumstances — such as when we take the 
subject to be an isolable entity — under which our everyday way o f dealing with others 
breaks down, and which lead us to want to make a distinction between human behaviour 
and the psychic life ‘behind’ it.22
As we have seen, an aspect of Heidegger’s analysis of being-with is his attempt to describe 
the way we relate to others on an average, everyday basis. How does Heidegger 
characterise our everyday way of relating to others? In a striking passage, Heidegger says 
that as everyday being-with-one-another, ‘Da-sein stands in subservience to the others’:
18 Heidegger, Being and Time, 118.
19 Heidegger, Being and Time, 118, emphasis in original.
20 Heidegger, Being and Time, 119, emphasis in original.
21 Heidegger, Being and Time, 121.
22 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 151.
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[As everyday being-with-one-another] It [Da-sein] itself is not; the others have taken 
its being away from it. The everyday possibilities of being of Da-sein are at the 
disposal of the whims of the others.23
Heidegger is not claiming that we are at the whim of particular others:
These others are not definite others. On the contrary, any other can represent them.
What is decisive is only the inconspicuous domination by others that Da-sein as 
being-with has already taken over unawares.24
For Heidegger, we essentially (primordially) ‘belong’ to these others. In fact, according to 
Heidegger, we call them ‘the others’ precisely in order to hide our essential belonging to 
them. But they are not particular others. In order to emphasis the fact that these others 
are not anyone in particular, Heidegger calls them the ‘they’ (Das Man). “We enjoy 
ourselves and have fun the way they enjoy themselves. We read, see, and judge literature 
and art the way they see and judge.’25 But how does the ‘they’ constrain or dominate us? 
According to Heidegger, the ‘they’ is characterised by ‘averageness’ and by ‘levelling 
down.’26 In this way, the ‘they’ ‘prescribes the kind of being of everydayness.’27 Under 
these conditions, according to Heidegger, ‘everyone is the other, and no one is himself. 
The “they” [...] is the nobody to whom every Da-sein has always already surrendered itself, 
in its being-among-one-another.’28
As Dreyfus points out, however, the norms and customs of the ‘they’ supply our everyday, 
customary or normal comportment. This is what sustains the ‘referential whole’ that the 
concept o f the ‘they’ refers to — in Dreyfus’s example: I n  the West one eats with a knife and
23 Heidegger, Being and Time, 126.
24 Heidegger, Being and Time, 126.
25 Heidegger, Being and Time, 126-127, emphasis in original.
26 From Heidegger, Being and Time, 127: ‘Every priority is noiselessly squashed. Overnight, everything 
primordial is flattened down as something long since known. Everything gained by a struggle comes 
something to be manipulated. Every mystery loses its power.’
27 Heidegger, Being and Time, 127.
28 Heidegger, Being and Time, 128.
41
fork; in the Far East one eats with chopsticks/29 Indeed, as Dreyfus observes, the very 
functioning of equipment is dependent on social norms, which ‘define the in-order-tos that 
define the being of equipment, and also the for-the-sake-of-whichs that give equipment its 
significance/30
Heidegger calls the self of everyday Da-sein the ‘they-self/31 He distinguishes the ‘they-self 
from the ‘authentic [eigentlich] self,’ which is the self which has ‘explicitly grasped itself/32 
As Dreyfus observes, the ‘they-self,’ immersed in average everydayness, is constituted by 
social meaning, while the authentic self is self-constituting.33 I return to the concept of 
authenticity in the following chapter.
Having discussed Heidegger’s concept o f being-in-the-world and being-with, I turn in the 
following section to Levinas’s criticisms of Heidegger’s treatment of these concepts in Time 
and the Other.
Time and the Other (1947)
The four lectures which comprise Time and the Other were delivered by Levinas in Paris in 
1946 and 1947 at the College Philosophique founded by Jean Wahl. As in Existence and 
Existents, Levinas’s writing is often evocative and unstraightforward. His purpose in the 
Time and the Other lectures, he says, is ‘to show that time is not the achievement of an 
isolated and lone subject, but that it is the very relationship of the subject with the Other.’34 
Levinas’s specific claims about time and its importance for the relationship with the other 
emerge in the third lecture, which I address below. First, however, I address Levinas’s 
engagement in the first lecture with Heidegger’s conception of being-with.
29 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 153.
30 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 154.
31 Heidegger, Being and Tim , 129.
32 Heidegger, Being and Tim , 129.
33 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 162, fn.12.
34 Levinas, Time and the Other, 39.
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Like Existence and Existents, Levinas proceeds in Time and the Other by attempting to describe 
being independent of beings; in this work, he adds the concept of the ‘solitude of existing.5 
Levinas notes in a 1982 interview with Philippe Nemo that his treatment of solitude in Time 
and the Other reflected the fact that solitude had become an existentialist theme. For the 
post-war existentialists, according to Levinas, existence was ‘the despair o f solitude,5 or ‘the 
isolation within anxiety.535 Levinas says that Time and the Other ‘represents an attempt to 
escape from this isolation of existing,5 as Existence and Existents ‘signified an attempt to 
escape from the “there is.55536 The significance o f the themes o f solitude and the ‘there is5 
will emerge as I proceed through Levinas5s arguments in this work.
Levinas5s main criticisms of Heidegger appear in the first couple of pages. Levinas5s chief 
claim in the first lecture is that in his accounts of Da-sein and being-in-the-world, 
Heidegger fails to think through the relationship between the existent and its existence. 
Levinas accepts that Heidegger's Sein-Seiendes (being-beings) distinction is a significant 
achievement. Nonetheless, for Levinas, Heidegger fails to consider the existent and 
existence in their ‘separation5 — that is, as radically separate — as well as in their interrelation. 
I discuss what Levinas means by this criticism below.
Moreover, according to Levinas, Heidegger misconstrues the nature of the relationship 
between Da-sein and the other. As I showed above, however, being-with-others — 
described by Heidegger using concepts such as Mitda-sein (‘Da-sein-with5 or ‘co-existence5) 
-  is a primordial (fundamental, originary) element of Da-sein5s being in Heidegger's 
fundamental ontology. On Heidegger's account, being-with-others is equiprimordial with 
being-in-the-world: ‘The world of Da-sein is a mth-mrld. Being-in is being-with others.'37 
The preposition mit (with) in Mitda-sein describes a fundamental relationship which
35 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 57.
36 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 57.
37 Heidegger, Being and Time, 118.
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constitutes human being; Heidegger says that ‘only because it has the essential structure of 
being-with is one’s own Da-sein Mitda-sein as encounterable by others.’38 We also saw 
above that Heidegger considers that I can be objectively present with others, and still be 
alone. In the case of solitude in the midst of sociality, according to Heidegger, the Mitda- 
sein of the others is ‘encountered in the mode o f indifference and being alien.’39 Levinas 
intends to ‘repudiate’ the view that solitude obtains ‘in the midst’ of a prior relationship 
with the other. This view, he says, is ‘anthropologically incontestable,’ but ‘ontologically 
obscure.’40 Levinas says that while Heidegger does posit the relationship with the other as 
an ontological structure of Da-sein, this way of being-with ‘practically plays no role in the 
drama of being or in the existential analytic,’ because all o f the analyses of Being and Time 
serve to describe ‘solitary Da-sein’ or the ‘impersonality o f everyday life.’41
Levinas claims that Heidegger’s characterisation of the with-relationship is as ‘an 
association of side by side, around something.’42 Introducing a concept which appears 
often in his later work, Levinas says that Heidegger’s way of thinking about the Da-sein- 
other association ‘is not the face-to-face relationship.’43 Levinas says that hopes to show 
that ‘it is not the preposition mit that should describe the original relationship with the 
other.’44 As he notes later, ‘being in direct relation with the Other is not to thematise the 
Other and consider him in the same manner one considers a known object, nor to 
communicate a knowledge to him.’45
Levinas’s notion of the direct relation with the other is more fully elaborated in Totality and 
Infinity, which is the subject of the next chapter. I shall attempt to unravel Levinas’s
38 Heidegger, Being and Time, 122.
39 Heidegger, Being and Time, 121.
40 Levinas, Time and the Other, 40.
41 Levinas, Time and the Other, 40.
42 Levinas, Time and the Other, 41.
43 Levinas, Time and the Other, 41.
44 Levinas, Time and the Other, 41.
45 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 57.
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positive claims in Time and the Other about the relationship between the existent and its 
existence in the following paragraphs.
The solitude of existing
Levinas’s central claim in the first lecture o f Time and the Other is that existing is solitary.
This is not meant straightforwardly to mean that we are alone. Levinas accepts that ‘we are
surrounded by beings and things with which we maintain relationships.’46 Indeed, we are 
with others through relationships of touch and sight and cooperation and sympathy. 
According to Levinas, however,
these relationships are transitive: I touch an object, I see the other. [...] I am not the 
other. I am all alone. It is thus the being in me, the fact that I exist, my existing, that 
constitutes the absolutely intransitive element, something without intentionality or 
relationship.47
I am not the other. Levinas says that ‘inasmuch as I am, I am a monad. It is by existing 
that I am without windows and doors, and not by some content in me that is 
incommunicable. If  it is incommunicable, it is because it is rooted in my being, which is 
what is most private in me.’48 My relationship with existing is ‘the interior relationship par 
excellence.’49 Levinas argues that the concept of ‘primitive mentality’ in the work of 
philosopher and ethnologist Luden Levy-Bruhl seemed to open up the possibility of a 
‘transitive existence’ where ‘through participation the subject not only sees the other, but is 
the other.’50 Levy-Bruhl argues that in ‘primitive’ people ‘collective mental states’ govern 
their partidpation in collective behaviour which is ‘so effectively lived that it is not yet 
properly imagined.’51 Levinas dismisses this possibility for ‘modem’ consdousness which,
46 Levinas, Time and the Other, 42.
47 Levinas, Time and the Other, 42, emphasis in original.
48 Levinas, Time and the Other, 42.; Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, §33.
49 Levinas, Time and the Other, 42.
50 Levinas, Time and the Other, 42-43.
51 Lucien Levy-Bruhl, How Natives Think, trans. L.A. Clare, 1910, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1926), 362; first
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according to Levinas, cannot ‘abdicate its secrecy and solitude at so little cost.’52
Moreover, according to Levinas, sharing existence is impossible. As he notes in a later 
interview: ‘the fact of being is what is most private; existence is the sole thing I cannot 
communicate; I can tell about it, but I cannot share my existence.’53 The solitude that 
Levinas is positing here has a special sense: is not mere physical isolation, nor the ‘the 
incommunicability of a content of consciousness.’54 Levinas argues that we exist in 
solitude. In other words, despite the fact that we live in relationships with beings and 
things in the world, in our relationship with our existing we are utterly alone. At issue is 
the ‘indissoluble unity between the existent [human] and its work of existing,’ which is a 
solitary relationship.
Levinas holds that ‘solitude [is] the isolation which marks the very event of being.’55 
According to Levinas, ‘to conceive a situation wherein solitude is overcome is to test the 
very principle of the tie between the existent and its existence.’56 But — and at this point 
Levinas’s break from Heidegger is clear — this principle is in fact tested. To test it ‘is to 
move toward an ontological event wherein the existent contracts existence.’57 The event by 
which ‘the existent contracts its existing’ is the phenomenon discussed in the previous 
chapter which Levinas calls hypostasis, and which he posits in contrast to Heidegger’s 
notion of ek-stasis. Levinas’s intention in this work is to ‘go back’ to this hypostasis, where 
the existent takes on its existence.58 I deal with Levinas’s treatment of hypostatis below. 
First, however, I shall deal with Levinas’s other specific criticisms of Heidegger.
published as Lucien Levy-Bruhl, luesfonctions mentales dans les societes inferieures, (Paris: Alcan, 1910).
52 Levinas, Time and the Other, 43.
53 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 57-58.
54 Levinas, Time and the Other, 43; cf. the fifth of Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations-. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations.
55 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 57-58.
56 Levinas, Time and the Other, 43.
57 Levinas, Time and the Other, 43.
58 Levinas, Time and the Other, 43.
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Why does Levinas think that Heidegger mischaracterises the relationship between an 
existent and existence? Levinas accepts that Heidegger distinguishes being (Sein) and 
beings (Seiendes); in fact, he says that this distinction is the profoundest claim in Being and 
Time:
One cannot ignore [Heidegger’s] distinction [...] between Sein and Seiendes, Being and 
being, but which for reasons of euphony I prefer to render as existing and existent [...]. 
Heidegger distinguishes subjects and objects — the beings that are, existents — from 
their very work of being. The first are expressed by substantives or substantivated 
participles, the other by a verb. This distinction, which is posited from the start of 
Being and Time, permits dispelling certain of the equivocations of philosophy in the 
course of its history where one started with existing to arrive at the existent possessing 
existing fully, God.
The most profound thing about Being and Time for me is this Heideggerian distinction.
But in Heidegger there is a distinction, not a separation. Existing is always grasped in 
the existent, and for the existent that is a human being the Heideggerian term 
Jemeinigkeit [mineness] precisely expresses the fact that existing is always possessed by 
someone.59
According to Levinas, the ontological difference is a distinction for Heidegger, and not a 
separation. As Richard Cohen observes in a footnote, Levinas means by this claim that 
Heidegger does not ‘think’ being and beings in their radical separation from one another, as 
well as in their interrelation.60 For Heidegger, being is approached through the analysis of a 
particular being, Da-sein.61 But as in Existence and Existents, Levinas wants to think being 
independently of beings. In that work, being independent of beings was called the ily  a or 
the ‘there is,’ and characterised as a ‘rumbling’ or a ‘field of forces.’62
Levinas thinks that Heidegger would find the notion of an existence without existents
59 Levinas, Time and the Other, 44-45.
60 Translator’s footnote no.9 in Levinas, Time and the Other, 45. Cohen notes the concept o f separation is 
‘doubtlessly’ borrowed from Fran2 Rosenzweig’s The Star of Redemption, in which he ‘aimed to think 
humankind, the world, and God, each on their own terms — that is, in their radical separation from one 
another; as well as in their interrelations.’
61 Heidegger, Being and Time, Intro., I.
62 Levinas, Existence and Existents.
47
‘absurd.’63 But he argues that Heidegger’s notion of thrownness (Gemifenheil), understood 
by Levinas as the ‘fact-of-being-thrown-in’ to existence, suggests the idea of an existence to 
be thrown into, so to speak, which must precede the existent that is thrown.64 In the 
notion of thrownness, for Levinas,
It is as if the existent appeared only in an existence that precedes it, as though 
existence were independent of the existent, and the existent that finds itself thrown 
there could never become master of existence. [...] Thus dawns the idea of an existing 
that occurs without us, without a subject, an existing without existents.65
How can we approach this idea of existence ‘without existents’? As in Existence and 
Existents, Levinas asks us to imagine ‘all things, beings and persons, returning to 
nothingness.’ As we saw in the previous chapter, after the destruction of all things and 
persons, all that remains is the ‘there is’, the anonymous, ‘impersonal “field of forces” of 
existing.’66 As Cohen suggests, the expression ‘field of forces’ implicitly refers to Kant’s 
account of the ‘conditions of our sensibility’ in the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ at the 
beginning of the Critique of Pure Reason; and Hegel’s account the ‘universal medium’ in 
‘Force and the Understanding’ in the Phenomenology of Spirit, and Nietzsche’s account of the 
will to power, where he holds that the T  is always the product of a preconscious ‘it’ made 
up of forces in contention.67
The anonymous, abstract existence of the ‘there is’ is not, says Levinas, the ‘indeterminate 
ground spoken of in philosophy textbooks, where perception carves out things.’68 This 
‘indeterminate ground’ of earlier philosophy is already a being, a substantive, a ‘something.’ 
The pure, ambient existing of the ‘there is’ that Levinas seeks to describe is the ‘very work
63 Levinas, Time and the Other, 45.
64 Levinas, Time and the Other, 45, ellipsis in original.
65 Levinas, Time and the Other, 45-46.
66 Levinas, Time and the Other, 46.
67 Translator’s footnotes nos. 16 and 17 in Levinas, Time and the Other, 46-47.
68 Levinas, Time and the Other, 47.
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of being/ which ‘cannot be expressed by a substantive but is verbal.’69 Moreover, it cannot 
be simply ‘affirmed/ because one affirms an existent. Nor can it be denied; it is the ‘field 
of forces of every affirmation and negation/ and it ‘imposes’ itself and is ‘irremissible.’70 It 
is never attached to an ‘object that i f , and for that reason it is described as anonymous.71
To clarify our understanding of pure existence, Levinas turns to a phenomenological 
examination of the experience of insomnia. Insomnia, according to Levinas, ‘is constituted 
by the consciousness that it will never finish — that is, there is no longer any way of 
withdrawing from the vigilance to which one is held.’72 In insomnia:
from the moment one is riveted there, one loses all notion of a starting or finishing 
point. The present is welded to the past, is entirely the heritage of the past: it renews 
nothing. It is always the same present or the same past that endures. A memory 
would already be a liberation with regard to the past. Here, time begins nowhere, 
nothing moves away or shades off. Only the exterior noises that may mark insomnia 
introduce beginnings in this situation without beginnings or end, in this immortality 
from which one cannot escape, very similar to the there is, the impersonal existence 
about which I was just speaking.73
The ‘there is’, then, is like a ‘vigilance without possible recourse to sleep.’ Further, this 
existing ‘is not an in-itself\en soi\ ,’ but rather an ‘absence of all self, without self \sans-soi\f1A An 
alternative way of considering the ‘there is’, according to Levinas, is to think of this existing 
as eternity, ‘since existing without existents is without a starting point/ and a subject is 
already a beginning.75 But an ‘eternal subject’ is a contradictio in adjecto, according to Levinas, 
for as a subject it would need a beginning, and consequendy would ‘exclude eternity.’76
Levinas notes that Heidegger concept of nothingness turns ‘nothingness into existing;’ by
69 Levinas, Time and the Other, 48.
70 Levinas, Time and the Other, 47, 48.
71 Levinas, Time and the Other, 48.
72 Levinas, Time and the Other, 48.
73 Levinas, Time and the Other, 48.
74 Levinas, Time and the Other, 49.
75 Levinas, Time and the Other, 49.
76 Levinas, Time and the Other, 49.
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claiming that ‘the nothing itself nihilates’ (‘Das Nichts selbst nichtef), Heidegger gives 
nothingness a kind of activity or being.77 According to Levinas, an important consequence 
of the idea o f the ‘there is’ is that there is being without nothingness. Recalling an theme 
from his early work, Levinas observes that being without nothingness ‘leaves no hole and 
permits no escape.’78 Being is ‘irremissible, without exit,’ and the notion of an irremissible 
being, Levinas says, ‘constitutes the fundamental absurdity of being.’79 The desire for 
escape from being of Levinas’s early work is the desire for an impossibility.
Hypostasis again
Levinas says: Terception and science’ — and, I add, Heidegger — ‘always start with existents 
already supplied with their private existence. Is this tie between what exists and its existing 
indissoluble? Can one go back to hypostasis?’80 How does Levinas treat the concept of 
hypostasis in Time and the Other? As we saw in Existence and Existents, hypostasis is the 
existent’s ‘contract’ with existence, or the process of ‘taking up’ existence. Levinas’s new 
step in Time and the Other is to speak of hypostasis in terms of a ‘departure from self and a 
return to self through which we take up a relation with our existing. Consciousness, 
according to Levinas, refers to a situation ‘where an existent is put in touch with its 
existing.’81 This process occurs in the ‘present’:
The present is the event of hypostasis. The present leaves itself — better still, it is the 
departure from self. It is a rip the infinite beginningless and endless fabric of existing.
The present rips apart and joins together again; it begins; it is beginning itself. It has a 
past, but in the form of remembrance. It has a history, but it is not history.82
77 Levinas, Time and the Other, 49; see Martin Heidegger, ‘What is Metaphysics?,’ in Basic Writings from Being and 
Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964) (London: Roudedge, 2002), 103.
78 Levinas, Time and the Other, 50; the notion o f an escape from being is prominent in On TLscape which is 
discussed in the previous chapter.
79 Levinas, Time and the Other, 51.
80 Levinas, Time and the Other, 44.
81 Levinas, Time and the Other, 51.
82 Levinas, Time and the Other, 52.
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Thinking of hypostasis as a present is difficult: ‘On the one hand, [hypostasis posited as a 
present] is an event and not yet something; it does not exist; but it is an event of existing 
through which something comes to start out from itself. On the other hand, it is still a 
pure event that must be expressed by a verb; and nonetheless there is [...] already a 
something, already an existent.’83 For Levinas, this process describes the phenomenon of 
the T.’ The T  is ‘amphibolous’ or dual-natured: ‘it is not a substance, nevertheless it is 
preeminiendy an existent.’84 Indeed, the ‘I’ stands ‘directly outside the oppositions of the 
variable and the permanent, as well as outside the categories of being and nothingness,’ 
even though ‘the present and the “I” turn into existents, and one can form them into a 
time, so that they have time like an existent.’85
The ‘work of identity’ is a process o f a ‘departure from self and a return to self through 
which we take up a relation with our existing: we ‘master’ our existing in this process, and 
we bear existing as an ‘attribute.’86 This turning back of the go onto itself, says Levinas, is 
‘precisely neither a serene reflection not the result o f a purely philosophical reflection.87 
Levinas says that the ego’s relation with itself is, ‘as in Blanchofls novel Aminadab, the 
relationship with a double chained to the ego, a viscous, heavy, stupid double, but one the 
ego is with precisely because it is me.’88 “‘Something that is,”’ for Levinas, ‘bears existing 
as an attribute. Existing is its own.’89 Indeed, according to Levinas, ‘my being doubles as a 
having; I am encumbered by myself.’90 With the claim that existing is an attribute, Levinas, 
like Heidegger, breaks from the dominant Western philosophical tradition.91
83 Levinas, Time and the Other, 52.
84 Amphibolous means having a grammatical structure that allows of two interpretations; equivocal; in logic, 
capable of two meanings. Levinas, Time and the Other, 53.
85 Levinas, Time and the Other, 53.
86 Levinas, Time and the Other, 52.
87 Levinas, Time and the Other, 56.
88 Levinas, Time and the Other, 56, citing Maurice Blanchot, Aminadab, (Paris: Gallimard, 1942).
89 Levinas, Time and the Other, 52.
90 Levinas, Time and the Other, 56.
91 Cf Kant: ‘Being is obviously not a real predicate, i.e., a concept o f something that could add to the concept
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As we saw earlier, Levinas claims that the purpose of these lectures is ‘to show that time is 
not the achievement of an isolated and lone subject, but that it is the very relationship of 
the subject with the O ther/92 He notes here, however, that ‘positing hypostasis as a present 
is still not to introduce time into being,’ and the concept of the other has not yet emerged 
in the discussion. This description of hypostasis as the present is incomplete:
The hypostasis of the present [...] is only one moment of hypostasis; time can indicate 
another relationship between existing and the existent. This is what will later appear 
to us as the very event of our relationship with the Other.93
By positing existence as something to be ‘taken up,’ rather than as something with which I 
already have a relationship, Levinas’s critique of Heidegger is clear. I now turn to Levinas’s 
discussion of the relationship with the other which appears in the third lecture.
The other
In the analysis so far, says Levinas, he has dealt with the subject alone, which is ‘alone due 
to the very fact that is an existent’; the subject’s solitude (in Levinas’s sense) results from its 
relationship with existence.94 Levinas observed in a later interview, however, that ''Time and 
the Other is a study of the relationship with the Other insofar as its element is time; as if 
time were transcendence, the opening par excellence onto the Other.’95 How does Levinas 
characterise the relationship with the other?
Levinas approaches this question through an analysis of death. For Levinas, our 
relationship with death is a relationship with something mysterious: ‘death is a region from
of a thing.’ Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, 1781, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), A598/B626.
92 Levinas, Time and the Other, 39.
93 Levinas, Time and the Other, 54.
94 Levinas, Time and the Other, 67.
95 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 56.
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which no one has returned and consequently remains unknown as a matter of fact.’96 
According to Levinas, Heidegger’s analysis of being-toward-death, which treats death as 
Da-sein’s ‘ownmost possibility,’ misunderstands death.97 For Heidegger, according to 
Levinas, authentic being-toward-death is a ‘supreme lucidity and hence a supreme virility.’98 
Heidegger’s authentic being-toward-death is the feat o f grasping a possibility, which means 
coming to understand it. Levinas claims that death is never a present; it is eternally futural, 
and consequently ungraspable: ‘the now is the fact that I am master, master of the possible, 
master of grasping the possible. Death is never now. When death is here, I am no longer 
here, not just because I am nothingness, but because I am unable to grasp.’99
How does Levinas derive anything about the relationship with the other from his analysis 
of death? As Cohen observes, Levinas thinks that what is common to death and social life 
is an encounter with radical alterity.100 Levinas draws a complicated parallel: according to 
Levinas, the ‘approach of death indicates that we are in relation with something that is 
absolutely other, [...] something whose very existence is made of alterity. My solitude is 
thus not confirmed by death but broken by it.’101 No longer solitary, my existence is 
‘pluralist’: ‘a plurality insinuates itself into the very existing of the existent, which until this 
point was jealously assumed by the subject alone.’102 This other — in this analysis, death -  is 
‘not unknown, but unknowable, refractory to all light.’103 My relationship with this other is
not an idyllic and harmonious relationship of communion, or a sympathy through 
which we put ourselves in the other’s place; we recognise the other as resembling us, 
but exterior to us. [...] The other’s entire being is constituted by its exteriority.104
96 Levinas, Time and the Other; 70.
97 See Heidegger, Being and Time.
98 Levinas, Time and the Other, 70.
99 Levinas, Time and the Other, 71-72.
100 Translator’s footnote no.52 in Levinas, Time and the Other, 75.
101 Levinas, Time and the Other, 74.
102 Levinas, Time and the Other, 75.
103 Levinas, Time and the Other, 75.
104 Levinas, Time and the Other, 75-76.
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In death, ‘the future is what is in no way grasped.’ ‘Anticipation of the future and 
projection of the future [...] are but the present o f the future and not the authentic future; 
the future is what is not grasped, what befalls us and lays hold of us. The other is the 
future. The very relationship with the other is the relationship with the future.’105
Death is an ‘event’ in Levinas’s special sense of the term: in other words, it happens to us 
‘without our having anything absolutely anything “a priori.’”106 Death is where the subject 
loses its mastery; it is ‘the impossibility of having a project.’107 On this basis, Levinas has 
taken his analysis to show the possibility of an event in death. Equally, for Levinas, there is 
the possibility of an event in the encounter with the other human:
The relationship with the Other [the human other, TA.utrut\, the face-to-face with the 
Other, the encounter with a face that at once gives and conceals the Other, is the 
situation in which an event happens to a subject who does not assume it, who is 
utterly unable in its regard, but where nonetheless in a certain way it is in front of the 
subject. The other “assumed” is the Other.108
The notion of the encounter with the other developed here is central to Levinas’s later 
thought, though in its later appearances it is for the most part detached from the concept 
of death.
At this point, the main elements of Levinas’s critique of Heidegger are clear for the first 
time. First, as we have seen, Levinas claims that while Heidegger opposes the 
contemplative conception of the isolated subject in the Western philosophical tradition, he 
still posits a Da-sein as a being whose primary mode of encountering the world is one of 
comprehension. Second, Levinas claims that on Heidegger’s account this relation of 
comprehension extends to the encounter with the other human. These criticisms remain
105 Levinas, Time and the Other; 76-77.
106 Levinas, Time and the Other, 74.
107 Levinas, Time and the Other, 74.
108 Levinas, Time and the Other, 78-79.
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central to Levinas’s engagement with Heidegger and stand at the core of his own 
philosophical project. In the following section, I follow the development of these lines of 
criticism in an important essay from 1951.
'Is Ontology Fundamental?' (1951)
In his essay ‘Is Ontology Fundamental?’ Levinas gives another account o f the encounter 
with the other which he had first sketched in Time and the Other. The significance of this 
essay lies in the fact that its central themes -  a criticism of Heidegger on the ground that 
ontology ‘reduces the other to the same,’ and the claim that the encounter with the other 
has a special structure — reappear and are reworked in Levinas’s major work Totality and 
Infinity (1963). I discuss that work, and Levinas’s augmentation of those claims, in the 
following chapter.
Again, in ‘Is Ontology Fundamental?’, Levinas’s main interlocutor is Heidegger. The 
central purpose of the essay is to characterize the relation with the other as a relation which 
does not reduce the other to an object o f comprehension. As in his discussion of the 
relation between being and beings in Existence and "Existents and Time and the Other, Levinas 
again argues that, even though Heidegger overcame Husserl’s ‘intellectualist’ philosophy, 
Heidegger’s ontology reduces others to something comprehensible, because others are 
already understood within ‘the horizon o f being.’109
What precisely does that claim mean? Levinas begins by recalling the central elements of 
his account of the development of phenomenology and ontology. He accepts that 
Heidegger brings aspects of human being to philosophical clarity. The achievement of 
contemporary ontology is to assert the ‘factual situation’ of the ‘mind that knows’; in
109 Levinas, ‘Is Ontology Fundamental?/ 5.
55
Heidegger’s terms, to assert Da-sein’s facticity and historicity.110 ‘This possibility of 
conceiving contingency and facticity not as facts open to intellection [as in ‘classical 
intellectualist’ philosophy] but as the act o f intellection,’ according to Levinas, ‘constitutes 
the great novelty of contemporary ontology.’111 Heidegger’s entire philosophy, however, is 
determined by what Levinas calls the ‘ontological relation’:
the comprehension of being does not presuppose a merely theoretical attitude but the 
whole of human comportment. The whole human being is ontology. Scientific work, 
the affective life, the satisfaction of needs and labour, social life and death — all these 
moments spell out the comprehension of being, or truth, with a rigour which reserves 
to each a determinate function. Our entire civilisation follows from this 
comprehension, even if this comprehension was a forgetfulness of being.112
In Heidegger’s thought, according to Levinas, ‘ontology is the essence of every relation 
with [other] beings.’113 Levinas argues that ‘comprehension, in Heidegger, rejoins the great 
tradition of Western philosophy: to comprehend the particular being is already to place 
oneself beyond the particular’ by comprehending it against ‘upon the horizon of being.’114 
T o  comprehend,’ on this account, ‘is to be related to the particular that only exists through 
knowledge.’115
For Levinas, this is a misdescription of the relation with the other. Levinas attempts to 
describe ‘in a very general way’ that relation as one which is ‘irreducible to comprehension, 
even to that comprehension beyond classical intellectualism determined by Heidegger.’116 
Why does Heidegger’s error arise? According to Levinas, it is an ancient problem for 
philosophy.
From the moment that one engages in reflection and precisely for the very reasons
110 Levinas, ‘Is Ontology Fundamental?,’ 2.
111 Levinas, ‘Is Ontology Fundamental?,’ 3.
112 Levinas, ‘Is Ontology Fundamental?,’ 3.
113 Levinas, ‘Is Ontology Fundamental?,’ 4.
114 Levinas, ‘Is Ontology Fundamental?,’ 5.
115 Levinas, ‘Is Ontology Fundamental?,’ 5.
116 Levinas, ‘Is Ontology Fundamental?,’ 5.
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which since Plato subject the sensation of the particular to knowledge of the universal, 
one is forced, it would seem, to subject relations between beings to structures of 
being, metaphysics to ontology, the existentiell to the existential.117
With this claim, Levinas seems to diagnose the source of the problem in philosophical 
reflection itself. Levinas also introduces a distinction, which will reappear in his work, 
between metaphysics and ontology. Referring to Heidegger’s ontological concept of 
‘letting’ others ‘be’ discussed above, Levinas asks: ‘How, moreover, can the relation with [a] 
being be, from the outset, anything other than its comprehension as being, the fact of freely 
letting it be inasmuch as it is being?’118 His answer is that the relation with a being cannot 
be anything other than an ontological relation of comprehension — and this is an important 
claim — unless it is a relation with the other (l ’autrui).u9 This, for Levinas, is a metaphysical 
relationship. What is special about the relation with the other?
Our relation with the other certainly consists in wanting to comprehend him, but this 
relation overflows comprehension. Not only because knowledge of the other 
requires, outside of all curiosity, also sympathy or love, ways of being distinct from 
impassible contemplation, but because in our relation with the other, he does not 
affect us in terms of a concept. He is a being and counts as such.120
The advocates of ontology, says Levinas, will not accept this way of speaking about others 
as beings: is not to speak of beings, they will ask, ‘already to insinuate that beings concern 
us thanks to a revelation of being’ — presumably referring to Da-sein’s primordial 
understanding of being — which is from the outset a relation of comprehension?121 ‘To 
relate oneself to beings qua beings means, for Heidegger, to let beings be, to comprehend 
them as independent of the perception which discovers and grasps them.’122 Indeed, for 
Heidegger, it is through this relation of letting be that the other appears as a Da-sein-like
117 Levinas, ‘Is Ontology Fundamental?,’ 5.
118 Levinas, ‘Is Ontology Fundamental?,’ 5-6, emphasis in original.
119 Levinas, ‘Is Ontology Fundamental?,’ 6.
120 Levinas, ‘Is Ontology Fundamental?,’ 6.
121 Levinas, ‘Is Ontology Fundamental?,’ 6.
122 Levinas, ‘Is Ontology Fundamental?,’ 6.
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being, and not as an object at hand or objectively present. ‘Being-with-the-other,’ 
according to Levinas, ‘rests for Heidegger on the ontological relation.’123
Here Levinas introduces another central claim about the mode of relating to the other. For 
him, our relation to the other is not a matter of letting the other be. Instead, the 
‘independence’ o f the other is established in ‘the role of being summoned.’124 The one to 
whom one speaks is not initially understood in his being: ‘the other is not an object of 
comprehension first and an interlocutor second. The two relations are intertwined. In 
other words, the comprehension of the other is inseparable from his invocation.’125 The 
other is not something encountered on the basis o f a preceding understanding of being.126 
In particular, the other is encountered as a ‘face,’ in a ‘face-to-face’ relation.127 According 
to Levinas, encountering the face of the other has a different structure from vision or 
perception. It has the structure o f speech: ‘a being as such [...] can only be in a relation 
where we speak to this being.’128
In these passages, Levinas explicitly introduces an ethical claim into what had hitherto been 
a scientific phenomenological project. As Peperzak observes, Levinas’s lengthy 
investigation of the foundations of phenomenology leads him to say, at this point, that the 
source of truth is the attitude which permits the other to present him- or herself ‘as he or 
she is,’ which for Levinas is as an other who summons us.129 In the next chapter, I raise the 
question of the relation between phenomenology and ethics in the European philosophical 
tradition, and discuss Levinas’s major work Totality and Infinity (1963), where Levinas takes 
up the claims presented in I s  Ontology Fundamental?’ and gives a full account of the
123 Levinas, ‘Is Ontology Fundamental?,’ 6.
124 Levinas, ‘Is Ontology Fundamental?,’ 6.
125 Levinas, ‘Is Ontology Fundamental?,’ 6.
126 See Peperzak, Beyond, 50-51.
127 This concept is developed at length in Totality and Infinity.
128 Levinas, ‘Is Ontology Fundamental?,’ 8.
129 Peperzak, Beyond, 52.
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ethical nature of the encounter with the other.
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3Heidegger and ethics in Levinas's Totality and Infinity (1961)
Raymond Geuss observes that there are several European philosophers who are concerned 
with questions of practical life but who are difficult to place in terms of their answers to 
the set o f questions usually understood as belonging to ‘philosophical ethics.’1 Attempts to 
fit philosophers such as Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Adorno and Heidegger under the usual 
rubrics of philosophical ethics fail: they do not offer clear instances of either 
consequentialist, deontological, perfectionist, or eudaemonistic approaches to ethics. 
Although they are concerned with practical life, they offer philosophical reflections which 
Geuss characterises as ‘radical versions o f thinking about practical life.’2
These thinkers, according to Geuss, break with the modem post-Kantian approach to 
ethics which for the most part tries to answer the question ‘what ought I to do?’. Their 
grounds for rejecting the main tradition o f philosophical ethics take one o f two forms: the 
‘weaker view,’ which is that knowing ‘what I ought to do’ is of marginal importance in 
practical life or indeed is not a philosophically significant question; and the ‘stronger view’, 
which is that to ask the question ‘what ought I to do?’ is a profound mistake or a failing, or 
at least that it is a failing to ask that question in a philosophical way.3 Geuss proposes to 
characterise these thinkers as standing ‘outside ethics.’
I contend that Levinas’s approach to ethics also stands outside the dominant tradition, but 
that he takes the weaker view. While he does not entirely reject the question ‘what ought I 
to do?’, he thinks that it is o f secondary importance for philosophical inquiry. Levinas does
1 Raymond Geuss, ‘Outside Ethics,’ European Journal of Philosophy 11.1 (2003): 29.
2 Geuss, ‘Outside Ethics,’ 47.
3 Geuss, ‘Outside Ethics,’ 44.
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not dismiss the possibility of constructing an ethical framework: he says in an interview, 
‘my task does not consist in constructing ethics; I only try to find its meaning. [...] One can 
without doubt construct an ethics in function of what I have said, but this is not my 
theme.’4 Nonetheless, his claims about the nature of ethical obligation place him outside 
the post-Kantian ethical tradition.
While those who for Geuss stand ‘outside ethics’ are more or less hostile to the mode of 
ethical inquiry of the dominant philosophical tradition, Levinas’s primary target is not the 
dominant tradition of ethics, but Heideggerian ontology. For that reason, while this 
chapter addresses Levinas’s ethical thought in his major work Totality and Infinity (1961), its 
main focus is on how Levinas’s thinking develops in his argument with Heidegger. In the 
first part of this chapter, I give a brief account of the relationship between Heidegger’s 
ontological project and his approach to philosophical ethics. In the second part, I trace the 
key claims of Totality and Infinity, where Levinas sets out again his criticisms of what he calls 
‘Heideggerian ontology’ and offers an elaboration of his claim that our encounter with the 
other gives rise to an ethical obligation, which is the central contention of this and later 
works. In the third part o f the chapter and in the following conclusion, I develop some 
criticisms of those claims with the assistance of Jacques Derrida’s long 1964 essay on 
Levinas, ‘Violence and Metaphysics.’
Philosophy and ethics in Being and Time and the 'Letter on Humanism'
Heidegger unambiguously rejects the modern approach to ethics. For the Heidegger of 
Being and Time, to ask philosophical inquiry to supply a framework for thought or action is a 
sign of inauthentic existence. In that work, the concept o f inauthenticity appears as 
deficient mode of (or, so to speak, a ‘running away’ from) authentic, resolute existence,
4 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 95-96.
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which accepts that human existence is ungrounded, temporal and finite.5 To demand a 
framework for human action is to hide from oneself these truths about existence.
While authenticity for Heidegger involves not thinking that there could be some 
authoritative answer to the question Svhat ought I to do?,’ his concept of authenticity has 
been interpreted by others as having moral content. In The Jargon of Authenticity, Theodor 
Adorno attributes the popularity o f Heidegger’s work to the ethical connotations of his 
ontological analysis which are explicitly excluded by Heidegger’s ontological project.6 And 
as Charles Guignon notes, authenticity seems to point to a way of life which is ‘higher’ than 
average everydayness.7 In part, the difficulty is a function of Heidegger’s project, which 
explicitly claims to be ontological (concerned with being) rather than ontic (concerned with 
the concrete), and yet must take concrete existence as its starting point. As Robert 
Bemasconi observes:
In so far as Heidegger was attempting to do fundamental ontology, he was committed 
to a formal analysis which withdrew from the concrete. But if Heidegger made the 
concrete Da-sein his starting-point, it was because he recognised its factical necessity 
from the outset To have recourse to a phrase Heidegger would employer later, one 
cannot jump over one’s own shadow. [...] Nevertheless, Heidegger had no qualms in 
reaffirming that to want to jump over one’s shadow remains the vocation of every 
philosopher.8
Nonetheless, Heidegger explicitly disavows any role for philosophy in practical life. In 
another early text, his Introduction to Metaphysics (1935), Heidegger says that ‘Philosophy [...] 
is not a kind o f knowledge which one could acquire directly, like vocational and technical 
expertise, and which, like economic and professional knowledge in general, one could apply
5 See, for example, Heidegger, Being and Time, 339: Inauthentic self-projection ‘is possible only because Da- 
sein has forgotten itself in its ownmost thrown potentiality-of-being.’
6 Theodor W. Adomo, The Jargon of Authenticity, trans. Knut Tamowski and Frederic Will, 1964, (London: 
Roudedge and Kegan Paul, 1973).
7 Charles B. Guignon, ‘Authenticity, Moral Values, and Psychotherapy,’ in The Cambridge Companion to 
Heidegger, ed. Charles B. Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 228.
8 Robert Bemasconi, ‘Fundamental Ontology, Metontology, and the Ethics o f Ethics,’ Irish Philosophical Journal 
4 (1987): 84.
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directly and evaluate according to its usefulness in each case.’9
Heidegger notes that shortly after the publication of Being and Time he was asked when he 
was going to write an ethics.10 While he does not record his answer, he comes closest to 
expressing an unambiguous position on the relationship between ethics and his philosophy 
in his ‘Letter on Humanism’ (1947). Heidegger’s position in that work is that to ask ethical 
questions o f philosophy (or in a philosophical manner) is a symptom of forgetfulness of 
being. There, Heidegger says that the task of philosophy is thinking about the truth of 
being, which is neither theoretical nor practical.11 ‘Thinking’ being ‘has no result. It has no 
effect. It satisfies its essence in that it is.’12
As we have already seen, Levinas’s approach to ethics is entirely different. I turn in the 
following sections to Levinas’s critique of Heideggerian ontology and Levinas’s own 
approach to ethics in Totality and Infinity.
Ontology and ethics in Totality and Infinity
Totality and Infinity is at the heart o f Levinas’s corpus. This work is Levinas’s first sustained 
attempt to substantiate his claims that the Western philosophical tradition has failed to give 
a satisfactory account of the way we encounter others in the world, and in so failing, has 
neglected the essentially ethical nature o f this encounter.
Again, Heidegger is Levinas’s main interlocutor. Taminiaux notes that Levinas’s preface to 
the German translation o f Totality and Infinity says that ‘ [t] his book which wants and feels to 
be of a phenomenological inspiration proceeds from a long frequentation of Husserl’s texts
9 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt, 1935, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2000), 7.
10 Heidegger, Being and Time, 255.
11 Martin Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism/ in Basic Writings from Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking 
(1964) (London: Roudedge, 2002), 259.
12 Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism,’ 259.
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and from paying a ceaseless attention to Sein und Zeit.,u Heidegger’s Being and Time was a 
work of fundamental ontology and, as we have seen, Heidegger there and elsewhere gave 
reasons why his philosophy was not an ethics. As Derrida observes, Levinas gives us 
simultaneously a metaphysics and a humanism.14
I claimed above that Levinas’s ethics stands outside the dominant tradition of philosophical 
ethics, and I noted that Levinas does not prescribe any moral rules. Even though he is 
concerned with ethics, Levinas’s work is best described as a ‘pre-ethical’ study. As Derrida 
says,
It is true that Ethics, in Levinas’s sense, is an Ethics without law and without concept, 
which maintains its non-violent purity only before being determined as concepts and 
laws. This is not an objection: let us not forget that Levinas does not seek to propose 
laws or moral rules, does not seek to determine a morality, but rather the essence of 
the ethical relation in general. But as this determination does not offer itself as a theory 
of ethics, in question then, is an Ethics of Ethics.15
Levinas appeals to a complex of phenomenological, theological and metaphysics claims in 
order to argue that the ethical obligation takes the form of a demand that the other makes 
of me, and that this (fundamentally unsatisfiable) demand is made at a basic level of human 
experience in our recognition of the other person. He begins, however, with an account of 
the error of Heidegger’s ontology which recapitulates certain criticisms from his earlier 
work.
Levinas’s major claim in section I of Totality and Infinity is that whenever Western 
philosophy has attempted to explain how we encounter others in the world, it has reduced 
‘the other to the same’ (the totality of the title) by interposing ‘a middle and neutral term
13 Jacques Taminiaux, ‘The Presence of Being and Time in Totality and Infinity,’ Paper delivered at Ethics and 
Politics in the Work of Emmanuel Eevinas (University of Jerusalem: 23 June 2003), 1, Taminiaux’s translation.
14 Jacques Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought o f Emmanuel Levinas,’ trans. Alan 
Bass, in Writing and Difference (London: Roudedge, 2001), 178.
15 Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics,’ 138.
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that ensures the comprehension of being.’16 According to Berkeley, for example, we come 
to know external objects only insofar as we perceive their qualities; we comprehend objects 
by spanning the distance which separates us from the object.17 For Berkeley, according to 
Levinas, ‘[t]he coinciding of lived experience [of subject experiencing the object] with itself 
was revealed to be a coinciding of thought with an existent.’18
Levinas argues that this ‘ontological imperialism’ is even more obvious in the 
phenomenological description of the encounter with others. On the phenomenological 
account, says Levinas, ‘it is the Being of existents that is the medium o f truth; truth regarding 
an existent presupposes the prior openness o f Being.’19 This latter claim means that the 
intelligibility of an existent ‘is due not to our coinciding, but to our non-coinciding with it.’ 
For Husserl, our experiences occur against a horizon of anticipated future experiences. In 
this way, says Levinas, ‘[a]n existent is comprehended in the measure that thought 
transcends it, measuring it against the horizon whereupon it is profiled,’ so that ‘an existent 
arises upon a ground that extends beyond it as an individual rises from a concept.’20
Levinas complains of a similar problem in Heidegger’s account. The central thesis of Being 
and Time, according to Levinas, is that ‘Being is inseparable from the [subject’s] 
comprehension of Being,’ which means that ‘Being is already an appeal to subjectivity.’21 
The nub of Levinas’s complaint is that Heidegger’s account assigns being ‘priority’ in 
relation to other beings (‘existents’ in Levinas’s terminology), and that consequendy — this 
is the second part of Levinas’s major claim — like the rest o f the Western philosophical 
tradition, Heidegger enslaves ethics to ontology. Because the encounter with other beings
16 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: A n Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis, 1961, (Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 43. This is a reduction to the ‘totality’ referred to in the tide.
17 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 44.
18 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 44.
19 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 44, emphasis in original.
20 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 45.
21 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 45.
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rests on a precomprehension of being, the encounter with other beings involves a 
‘reduction’ o f the other to the same: ‘the existing of an existent is converted into 
intelligibility; its independence is a surrender.’22 On Heidegger’s picture, Levinas argues, ‘to 
broach an existent from Being is simultaneously to let it be and to comprehend it.’23
To affirm the priority of Being over existents is to already decide the essence of 
philosophy; it is to subordinate the relation with someone, who is an existent, (the 
ethical relation) to a relation with the Being of existents, which, impersonal, permits the 
apprehension, the domination of existents (a relationship of knowing), subordinates 
justice to freedom.24
How are justice and freedom relevant to an account of our mode of relating to other 
existents? For Levinas, they describe the two possible ways of relating to others. Unlike its 
specific meaning in the dominant ethical tradition, where it describes a universal value, 
Levinas uses ‘justice’ as another way o f characterising the ethical relation with the other. In 
a similarly unorthodox way, Levinas uses ‘freedom’ to describe the Heideggerian 
ontological relation which, for Levinas, is unjust: ‘ontology,’ which maintains the freedom 
of the existent, is ‘a philosophy of injustice.’25
If freedom denotes the mode of remaining the same in the midst of the other, 
knowledge, where an existent is given by interposition of impersonal Being, contains 
the ultimate sense of freedom. It would be opposed to justice, which involves 
obligations with regard to an existent that refuses to give itself, the Other, who in this 
sense would be an existent par excellence. In subordinating every relation with 
existents to the relation with Being the Heideggerian ontology affirms the primacy of 
freedom over ethics.26
The freedom Levinas refers to here is not that o f free will. Heideggerian freedom, 
according to Levinas, ‘comes from an obedience to Being: it is not man who possesses
22 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 45.
23 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 45.
24 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 45.
25 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 46.
26 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 45.
66
freedom; it is freedom that possesses man.’27 The ‘relation with being’ of ontology 
‘neutralises’ the existent other in order to comprehend or grasp it. As such, it is ‘not a 
relation with the other as such but the reduction of the other to the same.’28 This reduction 
involves a freedom to ‘maintain oneself against the other [...] to ensure the autarchy of an 
I.’ This ‘primacy of the same,’ which ontology taken ‘as first philosophy’ assumes, ‘marks 
the direction of and defines the whole of Western philosophy.’29
The way the other person is encountered is distinguished by several other features. In the 
essay ‘Phenomena and Enigma’ published four years before Totality and Infinity, Levinas 
argues that the term ‘phenomenon,’ which suffices for describing our encounter with non­
human entities in the world, is not adequate to describe the way we experience another 
human.30 The other’s approach to me is enigmatic.
Language is the possibility of an enigmatic equivocation for better and for worse, 
which men abuse. One diplomat makes an exorbitant proposition, but this 
proposition is put in terms such that, if one likes, nothing has been said. The audacity 
withdraws and is extinguished in the very words that bear and inflame it. Such is the 
duplicity of oracles: extravagances are lodged in words that guarantee wisdom. [...]
This way the other has of seeking my recognition while preserving his incognito, 
disdaining recourse to a wink-of-the-eye of understanding or complicity, this way of 
manifesting himself without manifesting himself, we call enigma — going back to the 
etymology of this Greek term, and contrasting it with the indiscreet and victorious 
appearing of a phenomenon.31
Levinas speaks of the ‘disturbance’ created by the other who disrupts my ordered sense of 
myself.32 Crucially, the other seeks my recognition but at the same time preserves his
27 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 45.
28 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 46.
29 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 45.
30 Adriaan T. Peperzak, To the Other. A n Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, (West Lafayette: 
Purdue University Press, 1993), 62.
31 Emmanuel Levinas, ‘Phenomenon and Enigma,’ trans. Alphonso Lingis, in Collected Philosophical Papers 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1987), 66.
32 Levinas, ‘Phenomenon and Enigma,’ 63.
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selfhood.33 The ‘indiscreet and victorious’ appearance of phenomena contrasts with the 
‘enigma’ of the encountered other who ‘manifests himself without manifesting himself.’34 
How is the other encountered? Levinas calls the way the other presents him or herself to 
me ‘face.’35 The notion of face, according to Levinas, ‘brings us to a notion of meaning 
prior to my Sinngebung [‘sense-giving’ or ‘meaning-giving’] and thus independent of my 
initiative and my power.’36 In this way, the concept o f face is supposed to signify the 
philosophical priority o f the existent over being.37 The other’s mode of presenting him or 
herself ‘does not consist in figuring as a theme under my gaze. The face of the Other at 
each moment destroys and overflows the plastic image it leaves me. It does not manifest 
itself by these qualities, but [...] expresses itself** The experience of the other who is present 
exceeds our idea of them. The ‘infinity’ of the title o f this work refers to the impossibility 
of containing the experience of the other, which is a consequence of the ‘inadequation’ 
(lack of correspondence) of our idea of them to the experience of them as present.
How exactly does Heidegger’s ontology insist on the primacy of the same — the reduction 
of the other to the same, and the priority o f the relation to being over the relation to the 
other — and thereby subordinate ethics? As we saw above, Levinas argues that ‘the relation 
with Being that is enacted as ontology consists in neutralising the existent in order to 
comprehend or grasp it.’39 The ontological relation ‘is not a relation with the other as 
such,’ but rather ‘the reduction of the other to the same.’40 Thematisation, which is 
Heidegger’s name for the process of ‘objectifying’ beings encountered in the world ‘in such 
a way that they can “project” themselves back upon pure discovery, that is, they can
33 Levinas, ^Phenomenon and Enigma,’ 66.
34 Levinas, Thenomenon and Enigma,’ 66.
35 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 50.
36 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 51.
37 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 51.
38 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 50-51, emphasis in original.
39 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 45-46.
40 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 46.
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become objects/ is, according to Levinas, ‘not peace with the other but suppression or 
possession of the other.’41 For Levinas, ‘possession affirms the other, but within a negation 
of its independence.’42
This leads Levinas to develop his boldest claim: that ontology ‘as first philosophy’ is a 
‘philosophy o f power.’
A philosophy of power, ontology is, as first philosophy which does not call into 
question the same, a philosophy of injustice. [...] Heideggerian ontology, which 
subordinates the relationship with the Other to the relation with Being in general, 
remains under obedience to the anonymous, and leads inevitably to another power, to 
imperialist domination, to tyranny. [...] Being before the existent, ontology before 
metaphysics, is freedom (be it freedom of theory) before justice. It is a movement 
within the same before obligation to the other.43
This last sentence gives us Levinas’s central argument about why the primacy of ontology 
in Western philosophy is problematic. Ontology as first philosophy gives priority to a 
relation of comprehension within the subject before the obligation we have to the other. 
For this reason, the effort o f Totality and Infinity, says Levinas, ‘is directed toward 
apperceiving in discourse a non-allergic relation with alterity.’44 What would be such a 
‘non-allergic’ (that is, a non-reactive or non-rejecting) relation with other? What does the 
ethical relation entail?
The central idea is that the ethical relation is an unsatisfiable demand from the other to us 
which creates for us an obligation. I shall not dwell on the details of the ethical obligation 
other than to note that it does not entail any specific moral rules. Hilary Putman observes 
that this fundamental obligation is a ‘perfectionist’ obligation, but that it does not give us a
41 Heidegger, Being and Time, 363, Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 46.
42 Heidegger, Being and Time, 363, Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 46.
43 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 46-47.
44 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 47.
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code of behaviour or a theory of justice.45 Nonetheless, as Putnam says, if the obligation is 
not taken on, then ‘the best code of behaviour or the best theory of justice will not help.’46 
For the purposes of this discussion, Levinas’s most important claim is that the ethical 
relation precedes ontology.
If ontology — the comprehension [...] of Being — is impossible, it is not because every 
definition of Being already presupposes the knowledge of Being, as Pascal has said 
and Heidegger refutes in the first pages of Being and Time,; it is because the 
comprehension of Being in general cannot dominate the relationship with the Other.
The latter relationship commands the first. I cannot disentangle myself from society 
with the Other, even when I consider the Being of the existent he is. Already the 
comprehension of Being is said to the existent, who again arises behind the theme in 
which he is presented. This ‘saying to the Other’ — this relationship with the Other as 
interlocutor, this relation with an existent — precedes all ontology; it is the ultimate 
relation in Being. Ontology presupposes metaphysics.47
For Levinas, then, metaphysics (in his special sense, the relation to the other, which is 
enacted in ethical relations) ought to precede ontology (the relation to being).48
Derrida's critique
In this section, I shall deal with certain arguments from Derrida’s 1964 essay ‘Violence and 
Metaphysics.’49 As we have seen, Levinas criticises what he calls ‘Heideggerian ontology’ 
for subordinating the relation with the other to a prior comprehension of being. In 
Levinas’s words:
In Heidegger coexistence is, to be sure, taken as a relationship with the Other
45 Hilary Putnam, ‘Levinas and Judaism,’ in The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, eds. Simon Critchley and 
Robert Bemasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 38.. Putnam uses ‘perfectionist’ in 
Stanley Cavell’s sense: ‘Perfectionism, as I think o f it, is not a competing theory of the moral life, but 
something like a dimension or tradition o f the moral life that spans the course of Western thought, and 
concerns what used to be called the state of one’s soul, a dimension that places tremendous burdens on 
personal relationships and o f the transforming o f oneself and o f one’s society.’ See Stanley Cavell, Conditions 
Handsome and Unhandsome, (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1990), 2.
46 Putnam, ‘Levinas and Judaism,’ 38.
47 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 47-48, emphasis in original.
48 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 79.
49 Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics.’
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irreducible to objective cognition; but in the final analysis it also rests on the 
relationship with being in general, on comprehension, on ontology. Heidegger posits in 
advance this ground of being as the horizon on which every existent arises, as though 
the horizon, and the idea of limit it includes and which is proper to vision, were the 
ultimate structure of relationship. Moreover, for Heidegger intersubjectivity is a 
coexistence, a we prior to the I and the other, a neutral intersubjectivity.50
Levinas says that he is ‘radically opposed to Heidegger who subordinates the relation with 
the Other to ontology [...] rather than seeing in justice and injustice a primordial access to 
the Other beyond all ontology.51
As we have seen, the core o f Levinas’s objection is that Heidegger’s ontology assigns being 
‘priority’ in relation to the existent, and that like the rest of the Western philosophical 
tradition, Heidegger enslaves ethics to ontology. Derrida contests Levinas’s claims that 
Heidegger’s fundamental ontology subordinates ethics to ontology and the existent to 
being. Derrida’s defence of Heidegger rests on two related claims: that Heidegger is 
pursuing the ‘thought o f being,’ which is not ethical, and which does not assert any priority 
over ethical thought; and that Heidegger’s ontology does not subordinate the existent to 
being, because for Heidegger being is nothing outside the existent, so it could in no way 
precede the existent either in time or in importance. I shall discuss these claims in the 
remainder of the chapter.
As Derrida reminds us, Heidegger asserts in his ‘Letter on Humanism’ that the essence of 
thinking (which for him is philosophy) is the thought or question of being.52 Moreover, 
Heidegger makes this claim precisely in the context o f a discussion of the relationship 
between the thought o f being and ethics. On Heidegger’s account, thinking, the essence of 
which is the thought o f being, is neither theoretical nor practical.
50 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 67-68.
51 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 89.
52 Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism,’ 264.
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[T|n what relation does the thinking of Being stand to theoretical and practical 
behaviour? [TJhinking is a deed. But a deed that also surpasses all praxis. Thinking 
towers above action and production, not through the grandeur of its achievement and 
not as a consequence of its effect, but through the humbleness of its inconsequential 
accomplishment. [...] We measure deeds by the impressive and successful 
achievements of praxis. But the deed of thinking is neither theoretical nor practical, 
nor is it the conjunction of these two forms of behaviour.53
Derrida points out that thinking of being is neither ontology — which thinks beings in their 
being — nor ‘first philosophy/ nor a ‘philosophy of power.’ As Heidegger observes in the 
‘Letter on Humanism/ thinking that ponders the truth o f being ‘is neither theoretical nor 
practical. It comes to pass before this distinction. Such thinking is, insofar as it is, 
recollection of being and nothing else/54 As Derrida notes, ‘[s]uch thinking has no result. 
It produces no effect.’55 Indeed, being ‘foreign to every first philosophy/ the thought of 
being ‘is not opposed to any kind of first philosophy.’56 Moreover, says Derrida, the 
thought of being is ‘radically foreign to ethics/ but it is not ‘a counterethics, nor a 
subordination of ethics to a function in the realm of ethics that is already secretly violent: 
the neutral.’57 According to Derrida, ‘the thought o f being is neither concerned with, nor 
exercises, any power/ because ‘power is a relation between existents.’58 As Bemasconi asks, 
‘how could Levinas attack Heidegger for having subordinated ethics to ontology when 
Heidegger goes to such pains to displace that question?’59
Derrida’s second point, closely related to the first, is that Heidegger does not subordinate
53 Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism/ 262-263.
54 Heidegger, Being and Time, 259.
55 As Derrida notes, Levinas tends to construct the polls or social organisation whose outline is present in the 
discourse he is examining. In Levinas’s interpretation o f Heidegger, what is reconstructed is a city governed 
by a neutral, anonymous power. As Derrida observes, it is ‘paradoxical to see the Heideggerian city governed 
by a neutral power, by an anonymous discourse’ — the ‘imperialist domination’ and the ‘tyranny’ in the 
quotation from Levinas above — ‘that is, by the ‘they’ (das Man) whose inauthenticity Heidegger was the first 
to describe.’ See Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics,’ 171.
56 Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics,’ 171.
57 Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics,’ 171.
58 Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics,’ 171.
59 Robert Bemasconi, ‘Deconstxuction and the Possibility o f Ethics,’ in Deconstruction and Philosophy: The Texts 
of Jacques Derrida, ed. John Sallis (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1987), 127.
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the existent to being, because being is nothing outside the existent, and could in no way 
precede it either in time or in importance. In fact, he claims that Levinas already admits as 
much. In the section of Totality and Infinity where Levinas advances these criticisms, he says 
that ‘the primacy of ontology for Heidegger does not rest on the truism: “to know an 
existent it is necessary to have comprehended the Being of existents.’”60 As Derrida 
observes, this is a strange truism. Heidegger simply does not ‘affirm the priority of being 
over existents’ in the way that Levinas charges. ‘A banal truism is simply a repetition of the 
subject in the predicate. Now, being is not simply a predicate of the existent, no more than 
it is the existent’s subject.’61 In other words, we do not have a relation with being before a 
relation with the other, because being does not belong to the realm of predication, because 
it is already implied in all predication in general, and makes predication possible: being 
conditions our experience of it or any relationship to it, but is not in any meaningful sense 
‘prior’ to it. As Derrida observes, there can be an order of priority ‘only between two 
determined things, two existents.’62 And, as Levinas has accepted in his earlier discussion 
of the nothingness of the ‘there is’ in Existence and Existents, being is ‘nothing’ outside the 
existent, and so it could not precede the existent, ‘whether in time, or in dignity, etc.’63 There 
is no sense in which being could dominate the existent: as Derrida notes, ‘there are few 
themes which have demanded Heidegger’s insistence to this extent: Being is not an 
excellent existent.’64
So, while the thought o f being is neither ontology nor ethics nor first philosophy, it does 
have a certain significance. Indeed, Derrida argues that ‘no ethics — in Levinas’s sense — 
can be opened without’ the thought of being, because the thought, ‘or at least the 
precomprehension of being,’ conditions the ‘recognition o f the essence of the existent (for
60 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 45, emphasis in original.
61 Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics,’ 169.
62 Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics,’ 170.
63 Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics,’ 170.
64 Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics,’ 173.
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example someone, existent as other, as ofter self, etc.).’65 Derrida claims that without this 
‘letting-be’ of the other ‘as something existing outside me in the essence of what it is (first 
in its alterity), no ethics would be possible.’66 According to Derrida, Levinas 
misapprehends Heidegger’s notion of letting be,’ which does not mean, as Levinas thinks, 
‘to let be as an “object of comprehension first,” and, in the case of the Other, as 
“interlocutor afterward.’” On Derrida’s reading, Heidegger’s notion of ‘letting-be’ 
‘concerns all possible forms o f the existent, and even those [such as other humans] which, 
by essence, cannot be transformed into “objects of comprehension.’”67 Derrida points to 
Heidegger’s distinction between care (Sorge), which is directed toward things handy or 
objectively present, and concern (Viirsorge, or solicitude), which is the relation of care 
directed toward other Da-sein-like beings.68 I f  it belongs to the essence o f the Other first 
and foremost to be an “interlocutor” and to be “interpellated,” then the “letting-be” will let 
the Other be what it is, will respect it as interpellated-interlocutor.’69
The import of Derrida’s criticism is that what Levinas says of ontology is not true of 
Heidegger’s thinking o f being, which is not ontology, and that Heidegger’s attempt to 
separate ontology from thinking o f being in the ‘Letter on Humanism’ ought to be 
accepted as definitive o f his position. Moreover, Derrida claims that the thought or 
‘precomprehension’ of being does not make the other into an object of comprehension, 
but in fact permits us to encounter the other in their Da-sein-likeness. I address these 
criticisms in the conclusion.
65 Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics,’ 172, emphasis in original.
66 Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics,’ 172.
67 Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics,’ 172.
68 Heidegger, Being and Time, 121.
69 Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics,’ 172.
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Conclusion
As we have seen, Levinas objects to Heidegger’s ontology on the grounds that it assigns 
being priority over the existent and gives ontology priority over ethics. Levinas argues that 
the central thesis o f Being and Time is that ‘Being is inseparable from the [subject’s] 
comprehension o f Being,’ which he takes to mean that being has priority over the existent, 
since the encounter with the other (existent) rests on a precomprehension of being. On 
Levinas’s reading o f Heidegger, the comprehension of other beings involves a reduction of 
the other to the same: ‘the existing of an existent is converted into intelligibility; its 
independence is a surrender.’1 On Heidegger’s account, Levinas argues, ‘to broach an 
existent from Being is simultaneously to let it be and to comprehend it.’2 By reducing the 
other to the same agains the horizon of a fore-understanding of being, Heidegger asserts 
ontology’s priority over ethics.
As we have also seen, Derrida contests Levinas’s claims that Heidegger’s fundamental 
ontology subordinates ethics to ontology and the existent to being. Derrida claims that 
Heidegger is pursuing the ‘thought o f being,’ which is not ethical but has no priority over 
ethical thought; and that Heidegger’s ontology does not subordinate the existent to being, 
because being is nothing outside the existent, so it could not precede the existent either in 
time or in importance.
Derrida claims that Levinas gets Heidegger entirely wrong on key points. According to 
Derrida, what Levinas says of ontology is not true of Heidegger’s thinking of being, which 
Heidegger explicitly emphasises is not ontology. Derrida also claims that the thought or 
‘precomprehension’ o f being does not make the other into an object of comprehension,
1 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 45.
2 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 45.
but in fact permits us to encounter the other as a fellow Da-sein-like being. Again, he 
observes that Heidegger makes this claim unambiguously.
Levinas seems to accept that there are real difficulties with his position, and even admits to 
a certain hypocrisy. As he notes in the preface to Totality and Infinity, ours is an essentially 
hypocritical civilisation which is ‘attached both to the True and to the Good’; values which, 
he argues, are antagonistic.3 He suggests that ‘[i]t is perhaps time to see in hypocrisy not 
only a base contingent defect o f man, but the underlying rending of a world attached to 
both the philosophers and the prophets.’ On this argument, the difficulty with asserting 
any kind priority for a first philosophy reflects the fundamental nature of the world.
As Stephane Moses notes, Levinas’s work is a ‘thinking of the limit’ which ‘never ceases to 
refer to what is beyond the discourse of identity even while making it into a theme of its 
own discourse.’4 Does Levinas’s reading of Heidegger prove what Derrida elsewhere calls 
the ‘Hegelian law’ that ‘the revolution against reason can only be made within it’?5 As 
Derrida asks at the end o f his major essay on Levinas:
Are we Jews? Are we Greeks? [...] Are we (not a chronological question, but a pre- 
logical one) first Jews or first Greeks? And does the strange dialogue between the Jew 
and the Greek [...] have the form of the absolute speculative logic of Hegel, the living 
logic which reconciles formal tautology and empirical heterology?6
Derrida does not answer these questions there.7 In any case, an explicit reconciliation 
would conflict with Levinas’s intention, declared since Existence and Existents and
3 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 24.
4 Stephane Moses, ‘Emmanuel Levinas: Ethics as Primary Meaning/ Graduate Vacuity Philosophy Journal 
20.2/21.1 (1998): 21.
5 Jacques Derrida, ‘Cogito and the History o f Madness/ trans. Alan Bass, in Writing and Difference (London: 
Roudedge, 2001), 42.
6 Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics/ 192, emphasis in original.
7 The Derrida-Levinas encounter does not end here. In Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (1974) Levinas 
takes up Derrida’s criticisms in ‘Violence and Metaphysics.’ See Jacques Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, 
trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas, 1997, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999) and Simon 
Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas, Second ed., 1992, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1999) for fuller accounts.
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throughout Totality and Infinity, to leave the climate o f  Heidegger’s philosophy.
But has ‘the thought o f being’ always been Heidegger’s aim? Heidegger claims in the 
‘Letter on Humanism,’ the project of fundamental ontology in Being and Time was a 
‘preliminary’ attempt to approach the truth of being: ‘it strives to reach back into the 
essential ground from which thought concerning the truth o f being emerges.’8 He even 
says that ‘ontology’ — which ‘always thinks solely the being (on) in its being’ — is subject to 
criticism ‘not because it thinks the being of beings and thereby reduces being to a concept, 
but because it does not think the truth o f being and so fails to recognise that there is a 
thinking more rigorous than the conceptual. The poverty of its first breakthrough, the 
thinking that tries to advance thought into the truth of being brings only a small part of 
that wholly other dimension to language.’9 So, twenty years after the publication of Being 
and Time, Heidegger suggests that the ontological project in that work was flawed because it 
does not think the truth o f beings. As we have seen, Derrida’s defence rests on 
Heidegger’s claim in the ‘Letter on Humanism’ that the thinking of being is not ontology. 
But it is the ontology of Being and Time that is the object of Levinas’s criticism. Insofar as 
Levinas’s criticisms are directed towards Heidegger’ ontology, they are well-founded.
As Geuss observes, Heidegger’s constant goal was the permanent disabling of philosophy 
and philosophical ethics.10 Levinas, on the other hand, attempts to reanimate ethics with a 
thought ‘beyond being,’ which is the ethical demand of the face o f the other. The result of 
Levinas’s lengthy meditation on phenomenology and ontology up to Totality and Infinity is 
his claim that the primary truth is found in the attitude that enables the other to present 
him or herself as he or she is, that is, to moral consciousness.11 Levinas’s post- 
Heideggerian ‘metaphysics’ is an ethics of obligation to the other.
8 Heidegger, Being and Time, 258.
9 Heidegger, Being and Time, 258.
10 Geuss, ‘Outside Ethics,’ 42.
11 Peperzak, Beyond, 52.
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